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Summary 
Recent years have seen a resurgent interest in large scale input subsidies, and 
particularly fertilizer subsidies, in agricultural development and food security policies in 
Africa. Very high global grain prices in the first part of 2008 appeared to make such 
subsidies even more attractive, but this was complicated by even more dramatic rises in 
fertilizer prices. Global grain and fertiliser prices have subsequently fallen back, but high 
grain prices persist in many domestic markets, and future prices are very uncertain.   
This paper considers the roles of input subsidy programmes in poor rural economies in 
Africa in these difficult times. It begins with a brief review of historical changes in 
experience with and views of input subsidies, and of the factors behind resurgent interest 
in input subsidy programmes, particularly with a new generation of so called ‘smart 
subsidies’. It then describes how particular features of smart subsidies demand a 
rethinking of some aspects of economic analysis of the benefits of subsidies implemented 
in different ways and contexts. This provides the foundation for a conceptual framework 
for considering the key issues affecting the performance of subsidy programmes in 
discussion of recent experience of specific input subsidy programmes.  
The final part of the paper considers how current grain and fertiliser prices, and 
uncertainty regarding future prices, impacts on subsidy programmes, and asks what roles 
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input subsidy programmes may have under different price regimes in different contexts in 
the future, and what critical factors will determine their performance.  
Countries considering the introduction of agricultural input subsidies should recognise the 
different potential benefits they can yield, the conditions required for those benefits to be 
realized, and the possible very significant pitfalls from ineffective implementation:  
• input subsidies have played an important role in successful agricultural and broader 
development in the past, with major gains when effectively applied to overcome 
market failures constraining their productive use, but with substantial risks of costly 
and ineffective implementation using large amounts of scarce resources for little gain; 
• they have greatest (but not exclusive) potential in contributing to wider growth when 
applied to production of staple grains with a key contribution to consumers’ welfare 
and real incomes through lowering food prices, but this requires large programmes  
with complementary  investment and output market development policies to bring 
prices down (perhaps below import parity) and involves substantial costs and risks;  
• policy objectives of input subsidies are, like policy objectives in wider agricultural 
development, paradoxical – with investments in staple crop production and agriculture 
needed to stimulate diversification out of staple food and agricultural production; 
• rationing and targeting are important features of effective subsidies – to limit costs 
and ensure that subsidies are largely delivered to producers whose effective input 
use is constrained by market failures – and smart subsidies’ use for rationing and 
targeting can substantially address conventional criticisms of subsidies; 
• smart subsidies are nevertheless still subject to major political economy and 
implementation challenges and need further new thinking and theory, with ongoing 
action research seeking to constantly improve effectiveness and efficiency and to 
keep ahead of fraud and rent seeking. 
• agricultural input subsidies are not a short term ‘quick fix’ –medium to long term 
investments in input subsidies are needed if they are to build up farmer knowledge 
and capital, supply systems and wider economic growth. However the risks of their 
diversion, capture and inefficiency also grow over time, and this poses major political 
and technical challenges.  
 
There is currently limited implementation of important aspects of smart subsidies in 
subsidy programmes in Africa, and weaknesses in design and implementation. There is 
also a lack of emphasis on improving programme effectiveness and efficiency, and 
inadequate attention to integration with complementary policies and programmes needed 
to for achievement of both direct and indirect benefits of input subsidy programmes. There 
is also a mixed record as regards use of input subsidies to develop input supply systems. 
Some of these aspects of input subsidy programmes are associated with divergence 
between political economy and more technocratic interests.  
 
Lack of information on subsidy programmes in Africa highlights a major need for country 
studies that report different countries’ recent experience with input subsidies, using the 
conceptual framework presented in this paper to allow a more comprehensive review and 
lesson learning than is currently possible. 
 
Consideration of the considerable challenges and threats posed by global market and 
climate change and volatility emphasises the importance and urgency of (a) improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of input subsidy programmes in contributing to increased 
agricultural productivity, food security, and wider non agricultural development and 
structural change, and (b) of looking for ways to reduce fertiliser use (through greater field 
efficiency in their application and through use of complementary soil fertility management 
practices) and to reduce supply costs.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen a resurgent interest in large scale input subsidies, and 
particularly fertilizer subsidies, in agricultural development and food security policies in 
Africa. Very high global grain prices in the first part of 2008 appeared to make such 
subsidies even more attractive, but this was complicated by even more dramatic rises in 
fertilizer prices. While global grain and fertiliser prices have subsequently fallen back, high 
grain prices have persisted in many domestic markets, and future food and fertiliser prices 
are very uncertain.   
This paper considers the roles of input subsidy programmes in poor rural economies in 
Africa in these difficult times. The paper begins with a brief review of historical changes in 
experience with and views of input subsidies, and of the factors behind resurgent interest 
in input subsidy programmes, particularly with a new generation of so called ‘smart 
subsidies’. We then consider how the features of smart subsidies may demand a 
rethinking of economic analysis of the benefits of subsidies in different contexts. This 
provides the foundation for a conceptual framework for considering the key issues 
affecting the performance of subsidy programmes. This framework is then applied to 
discussion of recent experience of specific input subsidy programmes.  
The final part of the paper considers how current grain and fertiliser prices, and 
uncertainty regarding future prices, impacts on subsidy programmes, and asks what roles 
input subsidy programmes may have under different price regimes in different contexts in 
the future, and what critical factors will determine their performance.  
2. ‘Conventional’ input subsidies in agricultural development - theory and practice 
Large scale (so called universal) agricultural input subsidies were a common and major 
feature of agricultural development policies in poor rural economies from the 1960s to the 
1980s. They were generally implemented as ‘across the board’ price subsidies accessible 
to all producers, or to all producers of a particular category. If they were sold through a 
state monopsony then there were commonly attempts at price discrimination, with, for 
example, only smallholder farmers allowed to purchase subsidised fertiliser and forbidden 
from selling it on2. Fertiliser subsidies were particularly expensive and made heavy and 
growing demands on government budgets as they stimulated increased fertiliser 
consumption (and hence increased volumes of fertiliser subsidy) while political pressures 
also led to pressures for the subsidy rate to increase, or at least not contract, in the face of 
growing fertiliser prices. For discussion of fertiliser subsidies in Asia see Fan et al 2007, 
Timmer 2004, Morris et al, 2007;  Ellis 1992.  
                                                      
1
  This report has been commissioned by the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations. It draws heavily on work with Colin Poulton, Jonathan Kydd and Peter Hazell on 
agricultural development, and on work with Ephraim Chirwa, Thom Jayne, Duncan Boughton, 
Valerie Kelly, Eric Crawford and Rachel Slater on input subsidies. Parts of the text are drawn from 
Dorward, Poulton and Hazell (2008) and from Poulton and Dorward (2008). Frank Ellis, ‘BB’ Banful 
and Jamie Morrison provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any errors or omissions remain 
my responsibility. The views put forward in this paper are those of the author and are not 
attributable to any of these individuals or to FAO or any other organisation.  
2
  We will discuss ‘leakage’ from subsidy sales later.  
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Conventional arguments for subsidies in agricultural development have focussed on the 
promotion of increased agricultural productivity through the adoption of new technologies 
(Ellis, 1992). Reduced costs of subsidised inputs increase their profitability and reduce 
risks perceived by farmers in adopting them in circumstances where farmers’ limited 
knowledge first of input benefits and second of their correct usage inappropriately 
constrain their expenditure on input use. Together with credit and extension services, 
input subsidies were supposed to help farmers implement, benefit from and then, with the 
withdrawal of the subsidy, themselves fully fund economically and technically efficient 
input purchases and use: rapid learning with subsidies about input use and its benefits 
should mean that subsidies would be needed for only a short time and could be rapidly 
phased out. However subsidies were often subsequently implemented more widely with 
pan territorial pricing to support agricultural development in more remote areas, and to 
counteract taxes on agriculture through export tariffs, managed exchange rates and 
controls on domestic prices.  
Economic analysis of price subsidies considers the costs and benefits of subsidies in 
shifting farmers’ supply curves for agricultural produce (see figure 2.1). If there are no 
market failures then a subsidy of $Z per unit output increases effective producer price 
above the market price by $Z3, causing a downward shift in the market price supply curve 
(S to S’ in figure 2.1) and this leads to an expansion in supply (from Q to Q’) and a fall in 
market or consumer price of the product (from P to P’ in figure 2.1, assuming that the 
good is a non-tradable with a downward sloping demand curve), with an increase in both 
producer surplus (shown in figure 2.1 by the shaded area abcd) and consumer surplus 
(shown by the shaded area abef)4. The total cost of the subsidy is the total subsidy paid 
(new equilibrium quantity multiplied by the per unit subsidy, Q’.Z, shown by the shaded 
area dcef) plus administration costs. The total subsidy paid is greater than the sum of the 
increased consumer and producer welfare by a deadweight loss shown in figure 2.1 by 
the triangle bce (Siamwalla and Valdes, 1986). Under such circumstances, and even 
without allowing for administration costs, the subsidy would therefore lead to a net 
economic loss to the country and an income transfer from taxpayers to consumers and 
producers.  
Figure 2.1 Input subsidy impacts on output supply, price and stakeholder welfare 
S S’
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Q Q’
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price ($)
Produce quantity
e
d
c
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3
  If the subsidy is addressing a market failure then a subsidy of $Z per unit output will increase 
effective producer price above the market price by more than $Z (say $Z’) 
4
  The net gain in producer surplus can also be represented as the total increase in producer surplus 
represented by the area between the supply curves S and S’ below price P’ less the loss in 
producer surplus as the result of the price fall from P to P’, represented by the area between P and 
P’ and to the left of curve S. 
3 
 
Three related points emerge from this analysis.  
First, a subsidy can only generate a positive net economic return to a country if there is 
some market failure which means that the downward shift in the supply curve is greater 
than the cost of subsidising production, including the costs of subsidy administration (that 
is Z, the per unit cost of the subsidy to the government, is less than Z’, the effective 
increase in output price – or reduction in per unit costs - received by producers). This may 
occur where farmers’ perceived private cost of inputs is higher than the true social or 
economic cost, and/or the farmers’ perceptions of private benefits from increased input 
use are lower than the actual social or economic benefits5. Such situations can arise 
where (a) farmers’ private costs of working capital for input purchase are greater than the 
social cost of capital, (b) farmers’ lack of knowledge about the benefits of inputs means 
that their expectation of the production benefits from input use are less than the benefits 
that they will gain, (c) there are learning costs with input use such that initial farmer 
returns are low but these will increase with experience (see for example Ellis, 1992; 
Crawford et al, 2006; Morris et al, 2007) 6, and (d) farmers’ risk assessment and aversion 
in investing working capital  in input purchase and use is higher than society’s risk 
assessment and aversion. These divergences between farmers’ and society’s perceptions 
should decline as farmers gain experience with input use, with increasing knowledge of 
the benefits and risks of input use,  increasing knowledge of how to use inputs, and 
consequent increasing efficiency in their use.   
Second, the size of the deadweight loss and the distribution of benefits between 
consumers and producers depend upon the elasticities of supply and demand as shown in 
table 2.1 (see appendix 1 for diagrams). This is important as (a) larger deadweight losses 
are associated with increasing inefficiencies, and (b) the distribution of income transfers 
between producers and consumers has equity and poverty reduction impacts depending 
upon the relative wealth and incomes of the producers and consumers concerned.  
 
Table 2.1 Effects of demand and supply inelasticities on consumer and producer 
gains and on deadweights 
 
Perfectly 
elastic 
demand 
Unitary demand Perfectly 
inelastic 
demand 
Perfectly elastic 
supply, shifts down N/A 
All gains to 
consumers, Large 
deadweight 
All gains to 
consumers,  No 
deadweight 
Unitary supply,  
shifts down / to the 
right 
All gains to 
suppliers Large 
deadweight 
Shared gains, some 
deadweight 
All gains to 
consumers, No 
deadweight 
Perfectly inelastic 
supply (may shift to 
the right) 
All gains to 
suppliers. No 
deadweight 
Gains shared 
(depending on supply 
shift), No deadweight 
N/A 
 
Elastic demand or supply tends to be associated with larger deadweight losses, and 
demand or supply inelasticity tends to be associated with smaller deadweight losses. 
Similarly inelastic demand is associated with larger shares of consumer surplus benefits, 
while inelastic supply (both price elasticity and with regard to the subsidy) is associated 
                                                      
5
  This can be shown using marginal value product and marginal factor cost analysis, see figure 
3.3.1. 
6
  This is effectively an infant industry argument.  
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with larger shares of producer surplus benefits. Staple food markets in land locked 
countries (with large import/export parity price differentials) tend to be associated with 
more inelastic demand by poor consumers (where prices lie between export and import 
parity prices). Demand tends to be more elastic for cash crops, and particularly export 
cash crops. It should also be noted that an implicit feature of this analysis is that it applies 
only to subsidies implemented on a large enough scale to affect output prices - small 
scale subsidies that do not significantly affect production and product prices are 
analytically equivalent to subsidies with highly elastic product demand: subsidy benefits 
are largely captured by suppliers / producers, and deadweight costs depend upon the 
elasticity of supply  
Third, transfers to producers can be analysed in terms of inefficiencies associated with 
economic rents. Rents arise in three ways. First, if a general input subsidy is intended to 
deliver an economic gain by stimulating increased input use to increase production, part of 
the cost of the subsidy goes to reducing the cost of production for produce that would be 
produced anyway (this is the producer surplus on produce that would be produced 
anyway without the subsidy). Unless there is some social or economic benefit from 
transferring income to producers already using fertiliser, then the subsidy is an inefficient 
way of stimulating increased production and increased productivity, since the producer 
surplus to accruing to existing fertiliser use is not delivering any economic  gain. Second, 
producer transfers often end up affecting the demand for agricultural land and labour, and 
bid up the demand for inputs, and hence apparent producer transfers may in fact be 
passed back to the suppliers of these factors of production as pure economic rents7. 
Third, where subsidised inputs are rationed (as is common), then such rationing leads to 
opportunities for those controlling subsidised inputs (politicians, government officials, 
fertiliser suppliers, farmer organisation office bearers, etc),  to divert subsidised inputs 
from their intended beneficiaries  for a side payment or to demand payments from 
beneficiaries in return for provision of subsidised inputs. The important point here is that 
even if there are net gains from a subsidy (as a result of divergences between farmers’ 
and societies perceptions of costs and benefits from input use), much of the subsidy cost 
may be a straight transfer from the state (and hence from taxpayers) to producers and 
suppliers of land, labour and inputs without any economic gain (with the relative shares of 
transfers depending upon the elasticities of supply and demand).  
Another major concern with input subsides concerns the extent of leakages and diversion 
of subsidised inputs away from their intended use. In the context of the supply and 
demand analysis above, this can be considered in three ways – (a) diversion between 
products, (b) diversion from intended beneficiaries to others within the country, and (c) 
cross border leakage.  
a) Farmers are likely to apply inputs to the use from which they expect to get the greatest 
return. Fertilisers, for example, may be applied to a variety of crops. As we have seen, 
deadweight losses are reduced and benefits to poor consumers increased where 
subsidised inputs are used to expand production of products consumed by poor 
people with inelastic demand (these tend to be food staples). If returns to fertilisers are 
higher on other crops (for example cash crops) then farmers may apply subsidised 
fertilisers to cash crops which have much more price elastic demand and which are 
not consumed by the poor. Even if farmers do initially apply subsidised input to staple 
foods, with inelastic demand, a large scale subsidy will tend to reduce prices farmers 
receive for this crop, and this may in turn lead to fertiliser profitability and use 
switching to more demand elastic tradables – with increases in deadweights losses 
and reduced benefits for consumers. Switching of inputs between crops or products is 
not so directly possible for subsidised seeds8.  
                                                      
7
  This is of course not a problem where the providers of land and labour benefiting from this are 
poor, indeed it can be an important way in which subsidies can promote pro-poor growth. 
8
  Although some indirect switching may happen due to wider capital fungibility 
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b) Input subsidies in developing countries have commonly been targeted towards 
smallholder rather than commercial farmers, with mechanisms directing subsidised 
inputs away from large scale commercial farms and regulations prohibiting sale of 
subsidised inputs by recipients. Where a general subsidy is applied it is difficult to 
channel subsidised inputs to smallholders unless there are a limited number of tightly 
controlled supply chains, clear ways of identifying intended beneficiaries, and a high 
degree of discipline and control of private fertiliser transactions. If subsidised inputs 
are used by larger scale commercial farms this is likely to lead to increased diversion 
away from staple food crop production to cash crops (as discussed above) and a 
greater share of transfers to less poor producers. Similar issues arise in subsidy 
access between richer and poorer smallholders.  
c) Cross border leakages arise when subsidised inputs are sold outside the country at a 
discount. The value of the discount represents a straight loss from the transfer of 
resources outside the country, with the loss of any chance of consumer benefits or 
economic gain from increased input use.  
The final point to note from analysis of input subsidies’ effects on product supply and 
demand is that the extent of supply shifts is critical in determining deadweight losses, the 
distribution of transfers between producers and consumers, and the extent of wider 
economic gains. The supply shift is itself determined by the technical efficiency of input 
use – determined by the quality and appropriateness of the inputs to the product they are 
used on, the timing of their delivery to farmers, the availability of complementary 
resources (for example seed and fertiliser together), and the technical  skill or competence 
in the use of the inputs (in comparison with the without subsidy situation).  
The analysis above of product supply and demand impacts of input subsidies shows many 
of the things that can go wrong to undermine the economic benefits of input subsidies:  
the very large transfers to producers and consumers (reducing the efficiency of subsidies 
in achieving economic gains,  and leading to dominance of political economy rather than 
economic considerations in subsidy policy, with tendencies for these transfers to be 
captured by elites and/or used for political ends9); the presence of deadweight costs (in 
addition to administration costs, which have not been explicitly considered thus far in the 
discussion); the dangers of diversion and leakage; and difficulties in clearly specifying 
economic gains, with the tendency for these to diminish over time. More positively, 
however, the analysis also helps in the identification of features of subsidies that are likely 
to yield more benefits and to face lesser dangers of things going wrong. This in turn 
provides insights about where subsidies are most likely to be useful, and about the ways 
that subsidies should be implemented. It suggests that inputs subsidies should be 
focussed  
• on those producers who are not using inputs because of market failure, 
• on the use of inputs on products where they can induce a substantial  supply shift 
(and this may also require, for example, complementary input supply, extension 
and output markets infrastructure and services), and 
• on stimulating products with inelastic demand and supply (particularly inelastic 
demand) among poor producers and consumers: staple grain production tends to 
have these characteristics in poor large or land locked countries with suitable agro-
ecological conditions. 
It is noteworthy that although input subsidies are directed at producers and at changing 
production methods and producer behaviour, this analysis emphasises the importance of 
consumer in addition to (or rather than) producer benefits for maximising both economic 
and welfare gains from subsidies. Input subsidies should also be implemented in ways 
that (a) reduce deadweight losses and rents from straight transfers, (b) reduce leakages, 
                                                      
9
 This is a point made strongly by Bates (1981) 
6 
 
and (c) have low administration costs. The analysis also suggests that subsidies may be 
less efficient instruments if they are primarily aimed at delivering income transfers to 
producers and remote areas, because of high deadweight and administration costs, 
generation of rents, and difficulties in developing / delivering complementary services 
needed for technically and economically efficient use of subsidised inputs. The 
distributional impacts and multipliers from expenditure on input subsidies therefore also 
need to be considered against alternative (tax and subsidy or transfer) instruments for 
changing income distribution and for stimulating growth.  
The conclusions from the theoretical analysis above matches (and influenced) the 
conventional wisdom among most economists and northern policy analysts on difficulties 
with input subsidy programmes. This also emphasised difficulties with   
• controlling costs, both with general subsidies through, for example, fertiliser 
production or import subsidies and with quotas or targeted subsidies where there 
tend to be strong political pressures for the expansion of subsidies, and only weak 
pressures for their control.  
• ‘exits’: there is strong political resistance to scaling down or termination of 
subsidies.  
• effectiveness of targeting of input subsidies to particular farmer types, with 
problems of diversion and leakage noted above both expanding programme cost 
and reducing efficiency.  
• over use of inputs, or adoption of input intensive rather than more economically 
efficient labour intensive production methods, as a result of artificially low input 
prices  
• regressive benefits favouring larger farmers who can afford subsidised inputs (the 
poorest farmers may not be able to afford inputs even where they are subsidised).  
• market distortions, and particularly parastatal involvement in subsidised input 
delivery, tending to crowd out and inhibit private sector investment in input supply 
systems and provide opportunities for corruption, and hence impede sustainable 
development.  
Although agricultural input subsidies have continued to a greater and lesser extent in a 
number of countries, conventional wisdom and dominant donor thinking in the 80s and 
90s was that such subsidies had been ineffective and inefficient policy instruments in 
Africa and that they had contributed to government over-spending and fiscal and macro-
economic problems.  
From the mid 1990s, however, this conventional wisdom has increasingly been 
challenged with a resurgence of interest in agricultural input subsidies in Africa, new 
thinking about the historical and potential roles in agricultural development, and the 
complementary emergence of innovative subsidy delivery systems and instruments.  
3. Rethinking input subsidies  
New thinking on input (and particularly fertiliser) subsidies in Africa has arisen for a 
number of related reasons. The fundamental driver of this has been increased questioning 
by African politicians, by NGOs and by some policy analysts about the failures of 
liberalised policies in supporting broad based agricultural development, particularly 
sustainable intensification of staple food crop production. This has been accompanied by 
strong political demands for fertiliser subsidies in many countries; tensions among donors 
in resisting such demands (with increasing legitimacy of democratic governments in Africa 
and divergent donor views on subsidy merits); concerns about declining soil fertility, 
agricultural stagnation and rural poverty in Africa; and identification of input subsidies as a 
potential instrument for social protection policies. The Abuja conference marked a 
significant milestone in this. 
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These concerns have led to interest in the potential for input subsidies to deliver a wider 
range of (sometimes unstated) objectives than those formerly recognised in the 
conventional wisdom described earlier. These objectives include, in addition to those 
considered earlier10: 
• Short term private input market development  
• Replenishment of  soil fertility 
• Social protection for poor subsidy recipients 
• National and household food security  
• Meeting broad based political demands 
There has also been considerable interest in the development of new instruments and 
approaches in designing and delivering input subsidies, as so called ‘smart subsidies’. 
Morris et al. (2007) describe 10 features of smart subsidies: ‘promoting fertiliser as part of 
a wider strategy’, ‘favouring market based solutions’ in input supply, ‘promoting 
competition’ in input supply, ‘paying attention to demand’, ‘insisting on economic 
efficiency’, ‘empowering farmers’, ‘involving an exit strategy’, ‘pursuing regional 
integration’, ‘ensuring sustainability’, and ‘promoting pro-poor economic growth’ (op.cit, 
p103-104). They recognise that ‘in exceptional circumstances, poverty reduction or food 
security objectives may even be given precedence over efficiency and sustainability goals’  
(op.cit, p104-105). Instruments proposed for implementing smart subsidies include 
demonstration packs, vouchers, matching grants and loan guarantees. For all of these the 
details of instrument design and implementation are critical to their success. These 
instruments and design and implementation issues will be returned to later.   
 
The interest in getting input subsidies to serve new functions and objectives, and the 
extent to which input subsidies are the most cost effective way of achieving these 
objectives continues to be controversial. The main text of the 2008 World Development 
Report on “Agriculture for Development”, for example, recognises all the features of smart 
subsides outlined above, but its summarised position is more restricted and conventional, 
focusing on subsidy roles as being to provide  “sustainable solutions to market failures, 
…through … ’market smart’ approaches to jumpstarting agricultural input markets…., and 
underwriting risks of early adoption of new technologies to help achieve economies of 
scale … to reduce input prices …as part of a comprehensive strategy to improve 
productivity with credible exit options” (World Bank, 2008).  
 
It is, however, possible to question how important some of these objectives were in 
successful Asian Green Revolutions (for example replenishment of soil fertility, and social 
protection for poor subsidy recipients) and to identify other, perhaps more important, 
outcomes from subsidy use in these green revolutions or in more recent input subsidy 
programmes. Such outcomes include  
• long term ‘thickening’ of supply chains and rural markets;  
• lower staple food prices and higher wages;  
• increased real incomes for poor non-recipients as a result of food price and wage 
changes; and   
• longer term structural changes in livelihoods and the rural and national economy 
with expanded domestic demand for higher value livestock and horticultural 
products and for non farm goods and services together with expanded supply 
capacity, due to release of land and labour as a result of increased staple crop 
productivity. 
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These debates, together with new insights into development processes, require a 
revisiting of the conventional wisdom on subsidies:  
• a re-examination of the empirical and historical and empirical record of success 
and failure;  
• an examination of the various development opportunities and constraints facing 
African farmers; 
• a re-examination of theoretical understanding of contributions and implementation 
modalities of agricultural input subsidies in such situations; and 
• a more holistic conceptual framework for examining the roles, instruments and 
implementation of input subsidies 
 
The remainder of this section addresses each of these issues to provide a basis for a 
review of recent experience with input subsidies in Africa in the subsequent section.  
 
3.1. Revisiting input subsidies’ historical successes and failures 
A detailed examination of the empirical record of subsidies’ historical successes and 
failures is beyond the scope of this paper. However we briefly consider first the Asian 
green revolution experience with input subsidies and then African experience up to the 
early 1990s.  
The Washington consensus and then the Post Washington consensus on agriculture 
recognised the substantial success of the green revolution in Asian countries in driving 
growth and poverty and reduction but, implicitly or explicitly, considered this to have been 
achieved despite, rather than assisted by, input subsidies (and other subsidised services). 
This position was taken despite long standing work showing the importance of subsidies 
in Indonesia, for example, in promoting agricultural growth (Timmer, 2004) in precisely the 
types of situations where the analysis presented earlier suggests that such subsidies 
might have the greatest effect (food staples in large countries, with high physical returns 
from input use). Dorward et al (2004) in a review of green revolution experience in Asia 
argue that sustained (but not indefinite) input subsidies were a major part of successful 
Green Revolution packages, making a critical contribution to thickening and thus ‘kick 
starting markets’ first within staple food supply chains and then in the wider rural 
economy. Djurfeldt et al (2005) also argue that input subsidies were a critical element 
within green revolution policies, drawing on detailed policies reviews across a range of 
Asian countries. Fan et al (2007) provide empirical evidence on the contribution of input 
subsidies to growth and poverty reduction in India in the early stages of the green 
revolution but not later. This confirms an important point made by Dorward et al (2004), 
that later ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of input subsidies should not obscure their 
initial contribution in driving growth forward 11.  
Much of the Washington consensus pessimism regarding input subsidies was founded on 
later inefficiency of Asian subsidies and African experience of such subsidies. The Berg 
report criticised input subsidies as a major element in fiscally and economically 
unsustainable policies that were highly inefficient, ineffective and expensive in Africa. 
These policies distorted market incentives, blunted competitiveness and farmer 
incentives, and undermined the growth of private sector services. In this, subsidised input 
systems may have looked good for farmers (as regards services that were supposed to be 
provided), but the theoretical difficulties discussed earlier were compounded by diversion 
and inefficiency such that actual benefits to farmers were often very limited (World Bank, 
1981).  It should be noted, however, that there are countries that implemented input 
                                                      
11
 There are, ironically, parallels here with debates about the importance of agriculture itself as an 
initial driver of growth in poor rural economies: the later relative decline of agriculture in emerging 
economies should not obscure its earlier importance in getting broad based growth going. 
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subsidy systems that had initial success in raising productivity but for varying political and 
economic reasons failed to sustain the fiscal investment and market systems necessary 
for sustained benefits (for example Zimbabwe and Malawi).  
Dorward et al (2009) compare experience of state led and private market led development 
approaches in fostering widespread and sustained growth in smallholder food staples. 
They note that while there are egregious examples of failure with state led approaches, 
there are also examples of dramatic success (as noted above). Private market led 
approaches, on the other hand, have very few examples of success12, and many failures, 
but the failures of continued rural poverty are more hidden in rural areas and, to 
economists and policy analysts working with governments and businesses, consequent 
chronic humanitarian problems may be less obvious than macro-economic and fiscal 
crises.  
3.2. Development opportunities and constraints facing African farmers 
Successful investments in input subsidies in the Asian green revolution cannot, however, 
be simply transferred across to African countries – as experience in the 1970s and 1980s 
showed. It is important to identify the situations where input subsidies could work to take 
opportunities and overcome constraints facing African farmers.  
 
Poulton and Dorward (2008) and Dorward, Chirwa and Poulton (2008) consider 
constraints and opportunities for growth for different agricultural products in different 
situations in Africa and southern Africa. These are summarised in table 1 overleaf 
(adapted from Poulton and Dorward, 2008, and from Dorward et al , 2008).  
Drawing on insights from Byerlee et al. 2006 and Hazell et al. 2007, this table presents a 
typology that sets out first the major roles for increased productivity for different types of 
agricultural products in countries with different characteristics, and then the major 
challenges that need to be addressed to achieve increased productivity. Distinctions are 
made first between different types of crops and products (and implicitly between different 
agro-ecological zones associated with these). Maize, rice (notably NERICA) and possibly 
wheat (though this is a much less important crop in Africa) are cereals with potential high 
responses to significant investments in inorganic (and organic) fertiliser application. Millet 
and sorghum have generally lower yield potential, but there are still possibilities for 
significant yield responses in the context of integrated soil fertility management (ISFM) 
practices involving, for example, better water control, use of organic matter  and  micro-
dosing with critical nutrients13. Root crops, particularly cassava, have the potential for 
significant yield increases with intensification but although with time this will require 
substantial increases in fertiliser inputs, there are initial opportunities for major yield 
increases from improved varieties. Non-staple products are considered in terms of non-
tradables and tradables, the latter broken down between domestically consumed and 
exported tradables.  
                                                      
12
 It can also be argued that private market led approaches have never been properly tried – 
liberalisation of food markets has proved very difficult to consistently implement- and not just in 
Africa. This is, however, another challenge to private market led approaches. An exception to this 
has been the recent growth of smallholder fertiliser use in Kenya (Ariga et al, 2008) which, while 
aided by special conditions which prevent its wholesale application to other countries, nevertheless 
carries important lessons. 
13
 Morris et al. 2007 present data suggesting that maize and rice tend to have higher fertilizer 
responses than sorghum and millet, but that for all crops the responses are highly variable and 
sensitive to  rainfall, soils, fertilizer application methods and formulations, and complementary soil 
and other management practices.  
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Table 3.2.1 Typology of Agricultural Products by Roles, Countries and Challenges and Opportunities 
 
 Staple foods Non staple products with productivity potential 
 
High response cereals 
Maize, rice ?, wheat? 
Low response cereals 
Sorghum, millet 
Roots/ tubers 
Cassava, (sweet 
potatoes) 
Domestically 
consumed non-
tradables 
Domestically 
consumed tradables 
Traditional / non-
traditional exports 
Broad Role  Pro-poor growth 
Least cost welfare, 
growth platform 
Pro-poor growth 
Support growth, 
with staple 
spillovers 
Support growth, with 
staple spillovers 
Drive growth with staple 
spillovers? 
Countries 
with Minerals  
Support & spread 
growth 
Subsistence,  support 
& spread growth 
Support & spread 
growth 
Support & spread 
growth 
Support & spread 
growth 
Minor driver & spreads 
growth 
Coastal,  
No minerals  
Regional driver & 
supports growth 
Subsistence & support 
growth 
Regional driver & 
supports growth 
Support growth Support growth 
Regional driver & 
supports growth 
Land locked 
No minerals  
Major driver & then 
supporter 
Subsistence 
Major driver & then 
supporter 
Support growth Support growth Driver 
Technology 
Irrigation? Yield package? Processing? various various various 
Public goods 
(research, infrastructure, institutional environment) 
   
Policy coordination     
Complementary service coordination     
Global commodity & product prices (profitability, input affordability) 
   Price instability (intra & inter seasonal)     
Price / productivity tightrope     
Challenges  
Seasonal input finance     
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The high potential yields achievable with the ‘high response cereals’ and ‘roots and 
tubers’ suggests that these have the potential to make a major contribution to driving and 
supporting pro-poor growth in countries where these crops can be produced, depending 
on other potential drivers of growth in these countries.  
The lower but still improved yields achievable with ‘low response cereals’ in more 
challenging agro-ecological conditions  suggest that these will not be able to drive growth 
but they should have important roles in supporting growth and in providing a lower cost 
and more developmentally beneficial subsistence safety net (as compared with 
humanitarian relief). Again the role will vary between countries with opportunities for 
minerals, manufacturing industries and cash crops to drive growth (although the more 
challenging agro-ecologies where these crops are grown are also likely to limit cash crop 
and livestock development options14).  
The lower part of the table lists major challenges faced by the different products 
(assuming that they are being produced in broadly suitable agro-ecological areas).  All 
products face technical challenges and opportunities to increase productivity and stability, 
though the nature and extent of these challenges and opportunities varies between 
products and contexts. There is also common under investments in public goods provision 
(technical research and extension, market and institutions) particularly for staples where 
prices and value chain profits are limited. All products are also affected by uncertainty and 
variability in global commodity prices as they affect input and output prices. However the 
location of the text and thickness of arrows in table 1 also show that there are 
considerable differences between different products in the challenges they face.  
The key points here as regards consideration of roles of input subsidy programmes are 
that while high response cereals are (with roots and tubers) the products with the greatest 
importance and potential for driving and/or spreading growth they are also the crops which 
are most affected by challenges and failures in complementary service coordination, price 
instability, the price/productivity tightrope15, and seasonal input finance provision. These 
characteristics suggest that high response cereals fulfill many of the requirements 
identified in section 2.1 for well designed and implemented input subsidies to have a role 
to play in stimulating pro-poor growth:  
• the complementary service coordination and seasonal finance challenges are 
market failures that inhibit input use, so that the gains from subsidies addressing 
input affordability problems have the potential to exceed deadweight and 
implementation costs;  
• inelastic demand for food staples means that (a) deadweight losses should be 
relatively low and (b) many of the gains of producer subsidies should accrue to 
poor consumers - if subsidies increase production on a sufficiently large scale to 
lower prices – and in this way input subsidies can provide a means for addressing 
the food price/productivity tightrope. 
• they can, in the right agro-ecological conditions and with proper management, lead 
to substantial productivity and production increase 
 
This last point is important, in the context of arguments by Dorward et al (2004), in their 
review of  successful and partly successful green revolutions, that state interventionist 
approaches (including input subsidies) will not be effective, or will be less effective, if they 
are implemented in situations where basic conditions necessary for development have not 
                                                      
14
  In such situations investment in increased staple productivity may be a least cost way of providing 
safety nets in a way that encourages economic activity rather than dependency. 
15
  The price/productivity tightrope refers to the dilemma in poor agrarian countries where on the one 
hand high food prices are needed to stimulate investment in inputs  but on the other hand such 
prices damage poor consumers who spend a large part of their income on staple foods, and thus 
undermine poor consumer welfare and wider pro-poor growth.  
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been established, with (a) technologies and management  and soil, climate and pest 
conditions, that generate sufficient productivity gains and (b) complementary infrastructure 
and institutions to support extension services and market activities.16  This ties in with 
earlier arguments regarding potentially large deadweight costs from producer oriented 
subsidies in remote areas to suggest that input subsidies are likely to be more effective in 
areas with more favourable agro-ecological conditions for high response cereals and with 
good market access and higher population densities. This approach is articulated in 
recent thinking regarding prioritising investments in ‘breadbasket areas’ in Africa (AGRA, 
2008). This is not to say, however, that input subsidies will never be warranted for cash 
crops or outside breadbasket areas – there may be market failures inhibiting input led 
productivity growth which warrant input subsidies – but the nature of such subsidies are 
likely to differ from those aimed at stimulating input led productivity growth in staple crops 
for the principle benefit of poor food buyers.  
3.3. Rethinking input subsidies  - theory and practice  
Rethinking of the role of subsidies and the introduction of smart subsidies requires a 
revisiting of some of the conventional thinking about input subsidies as set out earlier in 
section 2. This is not to suggest that the earlier analysis or the insights it yields are faulty, 
but that it does not adequately reflect the ways that different subsidy systems can work 
and impact on producers and consumers. We extend the analysis of section 2 by 
considering a number of features of current subsidy programmes that are not explicitly or 
adequately considered in the theoretical considerations outlined earlier:  
• the role of subsidies in reducing input profitability problems;  
• the role of subsidies in reducing input affordability problems; 
• targeting of input subsidies to specific household types; 
• rationing of input subsidies; 
• impacts of subsidies on input supply systems; 
• dynamic effects of subsidies on pro-poor growth; 
• subsistence production and net deficit producers; 
• leakages and secondary markets; 
• entitlement and distribution systems; 
• complementary investments, policies and instruments 
• soil fertility replenishment 
• the political economy of input subsidies. 
 
3.3.1. The role of subsidies in reducing input profitability problems 
We can identify four ways in which the profitability of input use may be improved, by:  
1. Raising physical productivity of inputs – through adaptation of technologies and 
farmers’ learning how to manage them, and when (and when not) to use them 
2. Reducing the costs of inputs by increasing efficiencies in (for example) fertiliser or 
seed production and/or delivery systems 
3. Reducing farmers’ input costs through input subsidies  
4. Increasing output prices through market interventions (with either high consumer 
prices or with subsidies funded by tax payers) 
 
Conventional thinking on input subsidies emphasises their role in improving the 
profitability of input use primarily through approaches 1 and 3 above in order to (a) 
address farmers’ limited knowledge first of input benefits and second of their correct 
usage, (b) improve agricultural profitability in more remote areas, and (c) counteract taxes 
on agriculture through export tariffs, managed exchange rates and controls on domestic 
                                                      
16
 Dorward et al (2004) also note the need for implementation that is both effective and sustained long enough 
to achieve systemic structural changes in productivity and markets. 
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prices. While profitability constraints on input use on food crops continue to be important, 
the nature of these constraints has changed, and (as will be discussed later) at the same 
time affordability constraints have become more important.   
 
We discuss these two changes in turn. We note that different analysis may be needed for 
different inputs and consider first issues related to fertiliser subsidies before briefly 
mentioning differences with seed subsidies.  
 
On the changing nature of profitability constraints with regard to fertilisers, we consider 
first constraints to farmer purchases as a result of lack of knowledge of fertiliser benefits 
and of their correct usage. After many years in which fertilisers have been promoted 
through subsidies, it is generally no longer the case that most farmers are unaware of 
fertilisers’ benefits, indeed lack of access to fertiliser is commonly cited by farmers as a 
major constraint on their agricultural production. The extent to which farmers have direct 
experience of fertiliser use will vary, but past subsidy, demonstration and hand-out  
programmes together with fertiliser purchases by less poor farmers for cash crop 
production mean that in most areas there are farmers with direct experience of fertiliser 
use, and observation and reports of fertiliser use are widespread. Farmers’ ability to use 
fertilisers effectively and efficiently  (through proper selection of fertiliser types, 
appropriate timing and method of application, and use of complementary investments in, 
for example, soil and water management and crop varieties) is more variable, and input 
subsidy programmes continue to have a potential role in helping farmers to learn from 
experience here. This is likely to be particularly the case with poorer farmers who do not 
have access to fertilisers for cash crop production and who are also less able to access 
improved seeds and extension advice. However if fertiliser subsidy programmes are to 
help farmers improve their use of fertiliser then this requires subsidised provision of 
appropriate fertilisers and timely implementation supported by complementary 
investments in extension services and in promotion of improved soil and water 
management and crop varieties. Seed subsidies have an important and more 
conventional ‘profitability’ role in promoting both achievement and knowledge of higher 
returns from fertiliser use and of higher returns from their own use in conjunction with 
fertiliser.   
 
The high costs of fertilisers (as a proportion of crop production costs) mean that 
(perceived and actual) profitability of their use is strongly influenced not only by (perceived 
and actual) physical returns or responses to fertiliser use (discussed above) but also by 
relative fertiliser and crop prices. Relative global prices of crops and fertilisers have 
fluctuated over the last 40 years but do not show any systemic changes17. Relative 
domestic prices, however, will have changed in different ways in different countries: 
liberalisation policies from the 1980s will have generally led to higher food and fertiliser 
prices (due to exchange rate devaluations) but changes in relative prices will have been 
affected by continuing interventions in food markets, by differences in produce and input 
domestic market linkages to world markets, and by differences in import tariff rates. It is 
therefore not possible to generalise as regards declining or increasing profitability of 
unsubsidised fertiliser use over the last 30 years.  However variability in food prices is a 
major issue in many countries.  Risks of low food prices leading to low profitability of 
fertiliser use may depress fertiliser use in less poor farmers’ production of surplus food for 
the market. While fears of high food prices may make fertiliser use more profitable for 
poorer food deficit farmers, use of fertiliser by such farmers is more likely to be 
constrained by affordability constraints arising from problems in accessing seasonal 
finance, to which we now turn.  
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  There are differences, however, for some specific fertilisers –phosphate prices, for example, 
increased much more than nitrogenous fertiliser prices in the recent price spike.  
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3.3.2. The role of subsidies in reducing input affordability problems 
As noted in section 3.2 above, access to seasonal finance is widely considered to be a 
major constraint on input use on staple food crops, especially among poorer farmers. We 
describe this in terms of difficulties with the affordability of inputs. In theory farmers can 
finance input purchases from farm savings, from non-farm income sources or by 
borrowing (Poulton and Dorward, 2008). However (particularly poorer) small farm 
households are rarely able to save enough to fund significant intensification, and few have 
access to sufficient non-farm income sources for this purpose. Credit has therefore long 
been recognised as a priority to support input purchases and agricultural intensification  
(see for example Feder et al. 1985) and state provision of subsidised seasonal credit 
services were a significant part of the bundle of subsidised services, with input provision, 
in successful green revolutions (Dorward et al, 2004; Djurfeldt et al., 2005). Severe (and 
justifiable) criticism of agricultural credit programmes (for example Adams and Vogel 
1986; Yaron 1992) as fiscally unsustainable (with a large subsidy component and major 
repayment problems), and regressive (with the majority of loans going to well-connected, 
wealthy borrowers and limited benefits to poor households) led to their demise. The 
abolition of these programme has not, however, led to their replacement by private sector 
and micro-finance services for staple food crop production, although there have been and 
continue to be successful models for delivery of seasonal finance to non-staple producers 
(where higher value crops give limited numbers of produce buyers incentives to invest in 
smallholder production).  
 
The absence of complementary financial services allowing farmers to access credit to 
finance the significant costs of purchasing fertiliser means that only if subsidies lead to 
sufficiently large reductions in fertiliser prices will they lead to increased access to 
fertilisers by poorer farmers. If subsidies lead to smaller reductions in fertiliser prices 
which do not make them affordable by poorer farmers then they are likely to mainly benefit 
less poor farmers whose use of unsubsidized fertiliser is less constrained by lack of 
knowledge of how to use fertilisers or by inability to finance their purchase.  
 
 
Figure 3.3.1  Conventional marginal analysis of input subsidy impacts 
 
 
 
We examine this using analysis of input use comparing marginal value products and 
marginal factor costs. We begin by considering conventional analysis of the profitability 
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impacts of a subsidy as shown in figure 3.3.1. The basic Marginal Value Product and 
Marginal Factor Cost of input use in the economy are shown by MVPs and MFCs 
respectively. The economically optimum use of inputs will be at the point where MVPs = 
MFCs, with input use Is. A subsidy may be warranted, however, if information failures (lack 
of knowledge about inputs and their use) cause farmers to perceive that they will achieve 
a lower Marginal Value Product from input use (MVPp) causing them to apply input use up 
to the point Ip, a suboptimal use of inputs. A subsidy which lowers the price of inputs and 
hence the MFC from MFCs to MFC’ would result in farmers increasing their input use to 
the point where MFC’ = MVPp, which is the economically efficient rate of input use, Is.  
 
Inefficiencies in the subsidy can be seen in two ways. First, if there are some farmers who 
have a correct understanding of the benefits of input use, then these will apply inputs up 
to the rate Ix, where MFC’ = MVPs, and this will be an inefficient over-use of inputs. 
Second, the total cost of the subsidy per farmer (assuming that all farmers apply inputs at 
Is) will be the total amount of input used multiplied by the subsidy per unit input, 
represented by the rectangle acdf. However of this only the expenditure represented by 
the triangle bcd is actually stimulating increased input use, the remainder (represented by 
the area abdf) represents a transfer to producers (assuming no output price changes, ie 
perfectly elastic demand)18. 
 
We now extend this analysis by introducing affordability constraints in figure 3.3.2 with 
steeply rising credit interest and transaction costs above the marginal factor cost of input 
purchases.  
 
Figure 3.3.2 Input subsidy marginal analysis for capital constrained households 
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The basic Marginal Value Product and Marginal Factor Cost of input use in the economy 
are shown in figure 3.3.2 by IMVPs and IMFCs respectively, but the total marginal factor 
cost of input use (TMFCs) lies above IMFCs as a result of social costs of credit 
transactions and interest19. The economically optimum use of inputs will be at input use Is 
                                                      
18
   If demand in inelastic then output prices will fall with some of the subsidy cost providing benefits 
to consumers. 
19
   Marginal transaction and interest costs (the difference between TMFCs and IMFCs) are shown as 
constant irrespective of amount of input applied. It could be argued that these would fall 
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where MVPs = TMFCs. Poor households, however, face very high interest and transaction 
costs when borrowing short term capital (and they have very limited capital of their own, 
with high opportunity costs) and therefore have a much higher total marginal factor costs, 
shown  by TMFC1, leading to very much lower input use, which is often zero (as shown in 
figure 3.3.2). In such circumstances an input subsidy which substantially reduces the 
capital requirements and costs of input purchase can make input purchases possible for 
such households, as shown in figure 3.3.2 by a subsidised input marginal factor cost of 
IMFC’, leading to a lower Total Marginal Factor Cost (TMFC’1) and input use  of I’1. Note 
that the cost of the subsidy for these households is represented in figure 3.3.2 by the area 
acdf (the quantity of input multiplied by the per unit subsidy) and a large proportion of this 
(the area between TMFC’1 and IMVPs)  is directly stimulating extra input use.  
 
Not all households, however, are credit constrained and face high capital costs in the 
same way. The situation for such households is shown in figure  3.3.3:  the Total Marginal 
Factor Cost curve without the subsidy (TMFC2) is only a little above society’s Total 
Marginal Factor Cost (TMFCs) so that for this household the subsidy leads to a new Total 
Marginal Factor Cost (TMFC’2) below TMFCs so that their optimal input use at I’2 is 
greater than the economic optimum Is. The total cost of the subsidy to these households is 
ac2d2f, and of this only a very small proportion is directly stimulating extra input use (a part 
of b2c2d2e2, which is itself a small part of the total cost).  
 
Figure 3.3.3 Marginal analysis for more and less capital constrained households 
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This analysis of the differential economic costs and benefits from directing input subsidies 
to farmers facing different constraints is important as it suggests that programme 
efficiency and effectiveness in stimulating increased input use can be improved by smart 
subsidies that reduce the quantities of input subsidies received by less constrained 
farmers. This can be achieved in two ways: by targeting and by rationing.  
3.3.3. Targeting of input subsidies to specific household types 
The analysis set out in figures 3.3.1 to 3.3.3 suggests that the efficiency of an input 
subsidy programme can be improved in two ways by targeting of the input subsidy to 
specific types of farmer, if this ensures that it is directed to farmers (a) who would 
otherwise (as a result of credit market or information failures) use very little or no inputs 
                                                                                                                                                                 
somewhat with increasing quantities of inputs applied but the broad analysis presented here 
would not be affected if this were the case.  
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and (b) who will increase their input use substantially as a result of the subsidy. Condition 
(a) reduces the proportion of the input subsidy that is simply a transfer to producers who 
get cheaper inputs than they would have purchased anyway without the subsidy (with 
subsidised input purchases displacing unsubsidised purchases), while condition (b) 
means that those to whom the subsidy is targeted do use it to increase input use. The 
combination of condition (a) with (b) should also reduce incidences where a subsidy leads 
to overuse of inputs (beyond levels that are economically optimal).  
 
The marginal analysis in figures 3.3.1 to 3.3.3 is however restricted in that it assumes that 
output prices are not affected by the subsidy, or, in terms of previous discussion, that 
output demand is perfectly elastic. This can be explored by introducing another (lower) 
MVP curve into figure 3.3.3 to represent the effects of lower output prices where a subsidy 
increases production and output demand is not perfectly elastic: this should have the 
effect of reducing input use (I’(1) and I’(2)) somewhat. The effects of subsidy targeting 
where output demand is not perfectly elastic are, however, more helpfully explored by 
investigating targeted subsidy impacts on output supply and demand and on consumers 
and different producers, as in figure 3.3.4.  
 
Figure 3.3.4 Targeted subsidy impacts on output supply and stakeholder welfare 
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Figure 3.3.4 shows the effects of a targeted subsidy where the subsidy is provided to 
poorer, capital constrained producers with supply curve S1 which shifts to S’1 with an 
input subsidy which costs the government $Z per unit output but which effectively reduces 
production costs by $Z* per unit output (Z=Z* unless the subsidy addresses a market or 
information failure in which case Z<Z*, as shown in the figure). The result of this is an 
expansion of overall supply S to S’ (S = S1 + S2 and S’ = S’1 + S2, horizontal 
summation). The output price therefore falls, leading to a gain in consumer surplus as 
shown by axyf. Subsidised producers also gain producer surplus, as shown by ‘producer 1 
surplus’ (abgh). The gain in consumer welfare is achieved largely as a result of a transfer 
from producers who experience a fall in producer surplus as a result of lower prices (with 
a net welfare loss for unsubsidised producers). The total cost of the subsidy (represented 
graphically by fec’d) therefore leads to producer and consumer welfare gains equal to the 
area shaded as producer 1 surplus plus the extra consumer surplus less the transfer from 
unsubsidised producers (xyz): the net gain from the subsidy is then the extra gain in 
producer surplus 1 due the difference between Z and Z’ (dcgh plus xyz) less the 
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deadweight cost (bec’c) and this will be determined by the extent of the market/ 
information failure being addressed by the subsidy and on recipient and non recipient 
producer characteristics, and upon their relative numbers.  
 
As compared with an untargeted subsidy (as represented in figure 2.1) it should be noted 
that not only is this likely to be more economically efficient and effective, it also involves a 
transfer from less poor producers and tax payers to poorer producers and consumers 
(assuming that the subsidy is increasing production of a staple food crop). It might be 
argued that less poor producers should be compensated for this – and allowing them 
access to the subsidy is one way of doing this. The extent to which less poor producers 
actually lose from a fall in producer prices depends upon alternative activities open to 
them (affecting elasticity of supply).  
 
Much of course also depends upon the effectiveness of targeting and upon likely 
thresholds of minimum subsidy rates (or maximum input prices) for inputs to become 
affordable for poorer producers. These thresholds and political and power relations often 
result in smaller across the board subsidies being captured to a significant extent by less 
poor producers. In such circumstances poor consumers (some of whom may also be poor 
producers) will benefit if the subsidy leads to lower staple food prices, but any poor 
producers who are net produce sellers will lose from lower prices for their products.   
 
The targeting of subsidized inputs to different groups or types of people is, however,  a 
critical and sensitive issue, and there are significant costs and difficulties in targeting of 
subsidized inputs to different groups or types of people. In this it is helpful to distinguish 
between geographical targeting (between regions, districts and different geographically 
defined communities) and intra-community targeting (between different categories of 
people or households within communities). Geographical differences between areas and 
communities will often be correlated with socio-economic and cultural differences between 
these areas and communities. The distribution of subsidized inputs between different 
categories of people then depends upon the interaction of formal criteria determining 
geographical targeting and intra-community targeting together with ‘informal’ de facto 
criteria and mechanisms which are actually implemented. Costs of geographical targeting 
will generally be much lower than intra-community targeting. The relative effectiveness of 
these targeting approaches (in terms of inclusion and exclusion errors) depends upon 
inter- and intra- community differences and social, political and cultural factors. Targeting 
inevitably creates political tensions, with the relative threats posed by geographical and 
intra-community targeting again depending upon national, regional and local social, 
political and cultural factors.  Targeting will also commonly lead to secondary markets for 
inputs where recipients sell subsidised inputs to non-recipients. The effects of such 
markets are discussed later in section 3.3.8.  
 
The serious political, economic, welfare, and equity issues associated with targeting mean 
that targeting criteria and methods have to be constrained by political concerns and 
practicalities (at national, regional and community levels), by programme objectives (for 
example production, growth, or social protection objectives), and by the feasibility and 
costs of targeting. There may be arguments for comprehensive or area targeting that 
delivers smaller quantities of inputs (or of entitlements to inputs) to all households or 
farmers in a country or area.  
 
A final comment on targeting is needed on the relative efficiencies of input use by poor 
and less poor producers. It is often thought that poorer producers make less efficient use 
of inputs than better off producers, and hence that targeting of input subsidies to poorer 
producers  is less efficient than targeting them to less poor producers. It has been argued 
above that targeting poor producers has major benefits in terms of ensuring that subsidies 
address market failures (reducing displacement, and increasing welfare and distributional 
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benefits). These arguments will, however, be undermined if poor producers make less 
efficient use of inputs than less poor producers. It is therefore important to note here that 
there is a very large literature examining the relative efficiency of large and small 
smallholder farms, where larger farms are generally less poor than smaller farms (see for 
example Hazell et al, 2007). There is no universal relationship between farm size and 
efficiency, in some circumstances smaller, poorer farms are found to be more efficient, in 
other circumstances to be less efficient. However there is substantial empirical evidence 
supported by a continually evolving body of theory that smaller, poorer farms tend to be 
more efficient in the cultivation of labour intensive staple crops in poor rural economies, 
and larger farms tend to be more efficient in the cultivation of capital and market intensive 
higher value cash crops.  This suggests that where input subsidies are aimed at 
promoting staple food production (where input subsidies are most likely to address market 
failures and promote wider consumer benefits as argued in section 2) then targeting them 
at poorer producers will often lead to greater production efficiency in their use as well as 
more efficient wider benefits.   
3.3.4. Rationing of input subsidies  
Analysis in section 3.3.2 of the differential economic costs and benefits from directing 
input subsidies to farmers facing different constraints suggested that smart subsidies 
which reduce the quantities of input subsidies received by less constrained farmers could 
improve programme efficiency and effectiveness in stimulating increased input use by 
targeting and by rationing. Having analysed the effects of targeting in section 3.3.3, we 
now turn to consider the effect of rationing, with or without targeting.  For this we return to 
the marginal analysis used earlier in section 3.3.2.  
 
Figure 3.3.5 Marginal analysis of rationing of input subsidies 
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Figure 3.3.5 shows that a rationed input subsidy on I’1 inputs can stimulate input use and 
production  for capital constrained households (raising input use from 0 to I’1) and that 
production by other households is unaffected (at I2p), with receipt of subsidised inputs 
displacing inputs that would  have been bought anyway without any subsidy. Figure 3.3.6, 
analysing produce supply effects of a rationed subsidy, also shows that a rationed subsidy 
does not affect input use or production by less poor producers (for whom it displaces 
unsubsidised purchases), it only leads to increased input use and production by capital 
constrained producers. This drives down prices to the benefit of consumers at the 
expense of producers. Producer losses from lower prices are, however, offset by gains 
from receipt of the subsidy.  
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If the subsidy is targeted only to capital constrained producers this will lead to loss of 
welfare for other (less poor) producers, with substantial reductions in subsidy costs and 
limited  impact on production or produce prices and hence increased economic efficiency 
of the programme (as compared with universal provision). There will, however, be political 
economy costs as less poor producers will be direct losers from the programme. We can 
also analyse contrasting situations where there is no explicit targeting of poorer producers 
and indeed poorer households have more limited access to the subsidy than less poor 
households in terms of de facto targeting to less poor households. This will lead to almost 
no incremental use inputs or production, no price changes or benefits to consumers, and 
effectively provide a straight income transfer from taxpayers to less poor producers.  
 
Figure 3.3.6 Rationed subsidy impacts on output supply and stakeholder welfare 
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Rationing, whether targeted or universal, is only effective where there are no (or limited) 
secondary markets in which recipients sell subsidised inputs to non-recipients. The effects 
of such markets are discussed later in section 3.3.8.  
 
3.3.5. Effects of subsidies on input supply systems  
Effective large scale input subsidies should lead to substantial increases in volumes of 
inputs purchased by farmers, and this can have a number of different impacts on input 
supply systems and markets. We consider three different beneficial processes and 
impacts, and two damaging process.  
 
First, the short run effects of an input subsidy on the input market depend upon the nature 
of the subsidy and on the structure of the input supply system. If the subsidy is provided to 
farmers this has the effect of shifting input demand upwards. Alternatively input subsidies 
may be provided to input suppliers (India, for example, has used fertiliser subsidies to 
domestic producers to develop and protect its fertiliser industry, Fan et al 2007). The 
effects of this on the input market depend upon input supply elasticity, and this in turn will 
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depend upon structure, conduct and performance in domestic production and imports. 
This varies between countries and between different kinds of inputs. Few African 
countries produce fertiliser, with local fertiliser suppliers either importing blends or 
blending particular formulations from imported raw materials. Price elasticities for imported 
fertilisers should be very high, unless there are either significant importation costs and 
limited importation capacity (as may be the case for land locked countries, in which case 
increased input demand will bid up importation costs and revenues (rents) in importation, 
for example transport) or limited competition between importers (in which case increased 
input demand will bid up revenues (rents) of importers). The situation is often very 
different with seed supply, where imports are impeded by national seed certification 
controls and there is limited domestic capacity in seed production, with long multiplication 
lead times. Short and long run supply elasticities also differ (with greater long run 
elasticity). More elastic input supply leads to more of a subsidy accruing to producers (see 
figure 3.3.7), with gains for producers (and/ or consumers, as discussed earlier).  More 
inelastic supply, whatever its cause, leads to increased subsidy capture by input suppliers 
and reduced benefits to producers and/or consumers. Clearly agricultural development 
benefits from input subsidies are increased by more elastic input supply and decreased by 
inelastic input supply.  
 
Figure 3.3.7: Effects of different input supply elasticities 
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The second process by which input subsidies can impact beneficially on input supply 
systems involves first the realisation of economies of scale across the industry and within 
particular suppliers (as a result of increased volumes) and second the benefits of 
competition in increasing efficiency and reducing marketing margins where increased 
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volumes attract new entrants into the input supply business. These benefits should accrue 
to both subsidised and unsubsidised supplies of the same inputs, and expand supply, 
pushing supply curves down and to the right, with increasing supply elasticity. These 
processes of realising economies of scale and competition of course depend upon the 
nature of the inputs and their supply systems, and upon the ways in which subsidised 
inputs are acquired and disbursed (for example through general price support, voucher 
systems or direct issue with distribution involving government institutions, input supplier 
cartels, or competitive input markets). It should be noted that government supply is not 
incompatible with realisation of economies of scale in subsidised input disbursement, but 
the spillovers to unsubsidised sales are likely to be limited (unless government also 
markets these) and lack of competition faced by government organisations (and by 
cartels) tends to undermine the achievement  of such economies.  
 
The third process by which input subsidies can impact beneficially on input supply 
systems results from the ways that increased input supply and transactions may promote 
the development of new relationships and forms of relationships among input sellers and 
buyers in poor rural areas with, for example interlocking arrangements for linking input 
sellers, seasonal finance providers and produce buyers. Again these processes are 
critically dependent upon the nature of the inputs and their supply systems, and upon the 
ways in which subsidised inputs are disbursed, as discussed above. This process can 
also contribute to wider economic and market activity as increased input market activities 
have potential spill-overs into other markets (for example expansion of a network selling 
subsidised inputs may also buy and sell other commodities).   
 
The impacts of input subsidies on input supply systems are not, however, always 
beneficial. Damaging effects can arise in two main ways.  
 
First, input subsidies may create considerable uncertainty and risks for input suppliers and 
directly undermine the incentives for private investment in input supply systems. This 
occurs most obviously when governments intervene directly in input markets through 
direct supply of subsidised inputs and/or through regulation of input markets. Direct supply 
of subsidised inputs by government may take away business from private suppliers if 
there is significant displacement of unsubsidised sales by subsidised sales (and, as 
discussed earlier, this is common), leading to unsold stocks and lower sales volumes to 
carry fixed costs20. Regulation of input markets may restrict prices or volumes, or require 
sales of unprofitable lines or in unprofitable locations – again restricting revenues and 
increasing costs and risks. .  
 
A second way in which subsidies may damage the development of input supply systems 
is by distorting incentives so that input suppliers are distracted from investing to compete 
to expand profitable sales and instead divert resources and investments into competing to 
expand government contracts to provide subsidised inputs21. Unless subsidies are 
carefully designed to address and indeed exploit this, such investments are unlikely to 
lead to the development of longer term sustainable supply systems.  
                                                      
20
   An extreme case of this can arise if access to subsidies is very uncertain or deliveries are very 
late, such that farmers do not purchase unsubsidised inputs because they expect to obtain 
subsidised inputs, but then cannot obtain subsidised inputs (either because they are deemed 
ineligible for the subsidy or because the subsidised inputs do not arrive on time, in sufficient 
quantities, or in good condition). In such circumstances a subsidy can not only displace 
unsubsidised inputs but can actually depress total input demand and use.  
21
  There is anecdotal evidence that this may have affected input suppliers in Zimbabwe 
(concentrating on providing relief inputs subsidised by international donors in the early 
2000’s) and in Ghana (investing in relations with government for the 2008 subsidy). 
There is no suggestion that any of these involved corrupt behaviour, but such behaviour 
demonstrates more extreme incentive distortions.  
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The implications of this discussion are that subsidy programmes need to be carefully 
designed and implemented to promote supply system development in key areas where it 
needs development, and that long term stable relationships of trust need to be developed 
between governments and private sector – but these must also promote efficiency. Quick 
exits and unstable, changeable subsidy programmes are unlikely to induce the private 
sector investments necessary for supply system development. 
3.3.6. Dynamic effects of subsidies on growth  
Discussion of subsidy impacts in sections 3.3.2 to 3.3.4 has been largely concerned with 
‘static’ impacts, considering the direct impacts of subsidies on producer costs and 
decisions, hence on produce supply and prices, and consumer welfare. ‘Dynamic impacts’ 
of subsidies on producer knowledge of input benefits and on more efficient use of inputs 
were mentioned in section 2 as a means by which input subsidies can overcome 
information failures to induce long term change in perceived and actual input profitability 
and use, allowing subsidies to be withdrawn as producers using subsidised inputs learn 
about the benefits of inputs and about their efficient use. Such dynamic effects are an 
important part of conventional thinking about subsidies, and continue to be relevant, 
though as argued in section 3.3.1 lack of knowledge of the benefits of some inputs (such 
as fertilisers) is less important now than it was in the past. Similarly section 3.3.5 
considered some dynamic effects of input subsidies on the development of input supply 
systems alongside more static concerns about the distribution of subsidy benefits between 
input suppliers and producers.  
 
There are, however, two important potential dynamic benefits of subsidies that have been 
given much less emphasis in conventional thinking about subsidies.  
 
First, subsidies that are effective in raising land and labour productivity (with overall 
increases in on-farm labour demand) and in driving down food staples prices (as 
examined in consideration of output supply effects in sections 2 and 3.3.1 to 3.3.4), will 
raise the real incomes of large numbers of poor consumers as well as raise the incomes 
of poor producers, and this should expand demand for locally produced non-staple foods 
(horticultural and animal products) and non-farm goods and services, driving up local 
labour demand and wages. At the same time increasing staple crop productivity can 
release resources for the production of non-staple foods (horticultural and animal 
products) and non-farm goods and services. Such growth multipliers were critical in 
driving growth in Asia (Hazell and Rosegrant, 2000) and need to be given much greater 
emphasis in analysis of input subsidy impacts, in particular this requires more emphasis 
on subsidy impact on food prices and poor consumers or net buyers. It also requires 
implementation of subsidies over a longer period, to achieve structural change rather than 
short term productivity gains.  
 
Dorward (2009) describes three dimensions of development: the need for individuals and 
households, communities and wider economies to maintain their welfare (termed ‘hanging 
in’), a process of advancement by ‘stepping up’ existing activities by expanding their scale 
or making them more efficient, and a process of advancement by ‘stepping out’ into new 
activities. Both ‘stepping up’ and ‘stepping out’ require coordination across and between 
different scales of economic organisation (so that necessary production inputs and 
services are available, and so that growing supply is matched by growing demand). They 
also require a reasonable expectation of ability to ‘hang in’,  so that investment in stepping 
up and stepping out are not overly constrained by allocation of resources to low 
productivity hanging in activities. Where agricultural input subsidies contribute to raised 
land and labour productivity in staple food production, reduced food prices and raised 
producer incomes they are contributing to coordinated hanging in, stepping up and 
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stepping out in low income rural economies, and thus can play a very dynamic role in 
promoting wider development, growth and poverty reduction.  
 
The second way that input subsidies can have important potential dynamic benefits is 
through their stimulation of increased input and output and wider economic activity (as 
described above) then having positive spillover effects with ‘market thickening’. This 
happens if the greater volume economic activity stimulated by the subsidy reduces 
coordination and transaction costs and risks and promotes institutional and 
communications and transport service and infrastructure development (see Dorward et al 
2009, Dorward and Kydd 2004, Dorward et al 2004).  
 
Both these potential dynamic benefits of subsidies require longer term and stable 
implementation of subsidies to induce behavioural and structural  change. 
3.3.7. Subsistence production and net deficit producers 
The analysis of input subsidy impacts on output supply and stakeholder welfare (for 
example in figures 2.1, 3.3.4 and 3.3.6) analyse separately subsidy impacts on output 
producers and consumers, linked by their interactions in the market. This analysis is, of 
course, highly stylised. While there is evidence that many staple food markets in southern 
and eastern Africa are generally reasonably well integrated (Abdulai, 2007), they also tend 
to be characterised by high margins which inhibit exchange and incentives for surplus 
production (eg Barrett 2008). This, together with variable staple food prices and limited off 
farm income opportunities, leads to substantial subsistence production and very large 
numbers of African farmers (around 50%) who are poor deficit staple food producers and 
net staple food buyers (Barrett 2008). Such farmers are both producers who can utilise an 
input subsidy and consumers who benefit from lower food prices.  
 
Figure 3.3.8 presents a formal analysis of the within-household effects of subsidy receipt, 
showing the unsubsidised situation with domestic staple food demand D and own supply 
S, and market purchase price Pm and sales price Px. The household produces Qf from its 
own farm and purchases Qt-Qf. A widespread subsidy leads to a fall in purchase and 
sales prices (P’m and P’x) and own supply shifts to S’. The household now produces all it 
needs (Q’t) at a cost of P’ and neither sells nor buys staple food.  There is a substantial 
increase in producer and consumer welfare (and demand may shift as a result of higher 
income).  
 
Figure 3.3.8: Within household input subsidy impacts on food supply and welfare  
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The effects of a rationed subsidy are shown in figure 3.3.8 by the supply curve S’R with 
own production of QRf, total consumption of QRt, and purchases of QRt-QRf 22.  
 
The relative positions of D and S, the impact of the subsidy and situation of the household 
as autarchic or a net buyer or seller will differ between households according to household 
composition (consumers and workers), and access to land and capital. Subsidy impacts in 
production and consumption by many households will not be fully reflected by changes in 
quantities bought and sold in food markets, and this may dampen market effects of 
subsidies when measured in absolute terms. However the significant quantities of produce 
that are consumed within farm households without reaching markets also means that 
produce markets may be very thin, so that small % changes in production can lead to very 
large % changes in market supply and demand, making markets very unstable. This can 
be important for understanding the food market impacts of input subsidies (and indeed of 
any policy or natural events that affect smallholder production). 
3.3.8. Leakages and secondary markets 
Leakages were discussed earlier in section 2 in terms of cross crop, cross farmer and 
cross border leakages. These are closely related to the development of secondary 
markets where recipients of subsidised inputs sell their inputs to others, normally at prices 
that are discounted as compared with unsubsidised inputs. Such markets may arise with 
targeted and rationed subsidies, as subsidy recipients sell subsidised inputs to others as a 
result of differences in access to and needs for working capital (with poorer, capital 
constrained farmers selling inputs to less poor farmers) and/or differences in perceived 
marginal benefits to input use (with farmers with more land, for example, requiring larger 
quantities of inputs and looking for discounted prices).  
 
It is often argued that secondary markets should not be impeded because (a) farmers 
generally know what is best for them and (b) attempts to limit secondary markets 
generally lead to (poorer) sellers of inputs into these markets getting lower prices while 
(less poor) buyers and middlemen get higher prices – with regressive distributional effects 
as less poor buyers and middlemen capture a large share of subsidy benefits. Such 
arguments lead on to a related question that is often raised with regard to input subsidies:  
would it not be better to give poor producers cash rather than an input subsidy and let 
them choose what to do with the money? This is an important question as social 
protection and welfare policy make increasing use of cash transfers which avoid the 
significant inefficiencies and leakages common in subsidy administration and secondary 
markets.  
 
These are important considerations. There are, however, other significant arguments that 
suggest that secondary markets can fundamentally undermine input subsidy programmes’ 
wider benefits. At the heart of both conventional and more recent arguments for input 
subsidies are information and market failures and externalities, all of which cause 
individually optimising farmers to make decisions that are sub-optimal or inefficient in 
meeting the goals of wider society. A well designed and effectively implemented input 
subsidy programme can address four interacting sets of information and market failure 
and externality problems together:   
• Farmers’ under-valuation of the benefits of input use to themselves as individuals 
and to society, as a result  of inadequate information on the effects of inputs when 
properly used and on efficient ways to use them – an information failure 
considered in sections 2 and 3.3.1; 
                                                      
22
   Prices with the rationed subsidy are for simple exposition shown as P’m and P’x but in 
fact would not be expected to fall as much as with a full, unrationed subsidy and should 
be between Pm and P’m and between Px and P’x respectively.  
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• Poorer farmers inability to obtain seasonal working and consumption capital, or 
ability to obtain it only at much higher cost than the social opportunity cost of such 
capital – a credit market failure considered in section 3.3.2; 
• Farmers not benefiting directly from economies of scale when increased input 
volumes reduce input supply costs and margins - a non-market externality that 
arises from increasing returns to scale, considered in section 3.3.5; and   
• Farmers not benefiting directly from lower output prices and consequent dynamic 
pro-poor growth effects of subsidies which raise staple food production and 
productivity – a ‘market externality’. 
 
If cash transfers replace input subsidies, or secondary markets are encouraged, then 
welfare transfers can be delivered more efficiently to subsidy beneficiaries (subsidy 
recipients and/or staple food consumers) but cash transfers are unlikely to be able to 
address as efficiently at least three of the four information and market failure and 
externality problems described above23. This is because allowing people more 
unconstrained market choices cannot address those externality and information and 
market failure problems which arise precisely because private and social interests are 
misaligned.  Policy choices between cash transfers and input subsidies with or without 
constraints on secondary market operation therefore need to take account of specific 
policy objectives; of the nature of the informational, market, externality and distributional 
problems that need to be addressed; and of alternative instruments and combinations of 
complementary instruments that may be used.  
 
This discussion of the role of subsidies in addressing information and market failures and 
externalities has important implications not only for thinking and policies on secondary 
markets but also on farmer choice within subsidy programmes. It is sometimes argued 
that voucher systems can and should be used to extend farmer choice, with fixed value 
vouchers being redeemable for different inputs which farmers may choose between. This 
empowers farmers, and allows them to use the subsidy to invest in inputs that they 
consider will make the largest contribution to their livelihoods. The effectiveness with 
which subsidies address information and market failures and externalities may, however, 
require some restrictions on farmer choice, to ensure that their choices align with wider 
social efficiency objectives.   
3.3.9. Entitlement and distribution systems 
Any targeting or rationing system requires a method for restricting access to subsidised 
inputs. This requires a list or specification of entitled beneficiaries with specification of 
their subsidised input entitlement and then a mechanism that allows them to access that 
entitlement. This mechanism may involve either physical distribution of inputs from a 
specified distribution point against a list of entitled beneficiaries held at that distribution 
point, with some form of secure identification, or separate distribution of evidence of 
entitlement which can then be ‘redeemed’ by the beneficiary at authorised input retail 
outlets. Evidence of entitlement is most commonly a paper voucher, but scratch cards and 
electronic systems involving bank cards, electronic ‘smart’ cards and mobile phones may 
also be used. Since entitlements have considerable financial value, vouchers or cards 
need to be very secure as regards prevention of counterfeit fraud (with secure printing 
processes and print features and/or real time, secure and centralised monitoring of 
allocated and redeemed entitlements).  Different systems offer different potential benefits 
but pose different political, technical, administrative and social challenges within 
communities and households (the use of biometric information, for example, raises 
                                                      
23
 One would expect cash transfers to address seasonal credit market failures, but Gregory 
(2006) and Dorward (2006) suggest that this may not be the case as input subsidies 
may help with ‘enforced savings’ as money savings are too fungible.  
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questions about intra-household control over input subsidy entitlements; electronic 
systems must be able to operate in areas with no electricity, and some require reliable 
mobile phone network access and expensive equipment). 
 
Entitlements may be input specific (entitling the beneficiary to a particular quantity of a 
particular input on payment of a top up) or flexible (entitling the beneficiary to choose 
between a limited range of specified inputs on payment of a top up). They may also be 
fixed value (with the top up varying when used in different locations or outlets or, with 
flexible vouchers, when used for different inputs) or be associated with a fixed top up 
(where the top up paid by the beneficiary is constant but the value of the subsidy varies, 
when redeemed by the retail outlet). Flexible vouchers are normally also fixed value 
vouchers. There are important interactions between types of vouchers, secondary 
markets, recipient choice (of inputs and suppliers), control of fraud and of programme 
costs, and gendered access to  and control of subsidised inputs within households.   
 
3.3.10. Complementary integration, investments and policies 
Positive impacts from input subsidies are determined by the on-farm physical productivity 
of inputs; by input supply system efficiency, transport and communication systems and 
costs; and by output market efficiency (as these affect marginal value products of input 
use, output supply curves and shifts, and output demand curves and elasticities) – as well 
as by the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation of the subsidy programme itself. 
Programme impacts can therefore often be enhanced by complementary investments in 
agricultural research and extension that can raise input productivity; by subsidies for 
complementary inputs (for example seeds and fertilisers); and by investments in road, 
communications, and market infrastructure and service development. Programme 
effectiveness and efficiency can also be improved by designing and implementing subsidy 
and other policy instruments in ways that are complementary (for example cash transfer 
or cash for work programmes may be linked to subsidy entitlement systems to facilitate 
participation by and benefit for very poor producers, or subsidy entitlements may be linked 
to and incentivise investments in soil and water conservation). Complementary 
development of staple food markets is an area of complementary policy that is particularly 
important given the way that major subsidy benefits involve consumers’ accessing food at 
lower prices.  
 
3.3.11. Soil fertility replenishment 
As noted earlier, one of the reasons put forward for fertiliser subsidies is the need to 
combat the alarming decline in soil nutrients in many parts of Africa and the need for (and 
benefits of) their replenishment. Crawford et al 2006   summarise soil fertility problems in 
terms of declining fallows, rapid deforestation, land degradation, and declining nitrogen, 
phosphate and potassium levels in arable soils. Subsidies to promote the application of 
fertilisers may then be justified in terms of externalities from increasing fertiliser 
application where fertiliser use, higher soil fertility and higher farm yields provide a number 
of benefits to society rather than to individual farmers:  reductions in soil erosion and 
downstream flooding and siltation, in deforestation and CO2 emissions, and in soil and 
wider ecosystem and biodiversity loss as a result of reduced pressures to cultivate 
marginal and fragile land;  and reductions in poverty and in rural-urban migration, and 
hence in wider social costs of addressing rural and urban poverty as a result of increased 
farm and rural incomes (Sánchez et al.,  1997). It may also be argued that poverty and 
food insecurity cause many African farmers to place a higher value on short term income 
and food production and a lower value on longer term investments in soil fertility and other 
types of natural capital (as compared with their value to wider society), again leading to 
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under investment in soil fertility and a justification for subsidies to promote investments in 
better soil management. 
3.3.12. Political economy issues 
Another important set of issues affecting the implementation and outcomes of input 
subsidy programmes concern domestic and international political contexts and processes. 
These are given increasing recognition in agricultural development policy analysis (see for 
example Birner and Resnick, 2005; Cabral and Scoones, 2006; World Bank, 2007) but 
detailed analyses of study of policy processes in input subsidy programmes are less 
common (Chinsinga, 2006, and Dorward et al, 2008 are exceptions). Political processes 
are, however, extremely important for input subsidy programmes.   
 
Large scale input subsidy programmes are extremely costly, they represent very 
significant transfers to subsidy recipients, and they offer opportunities for very substantial 
captures of rents by a variety of stakeholders (politicians, programme administrators, input 
suppliers, traders, and less poor farmers).  
 
As a result, political economy difficulties with large scale input subsidies are found in 
almost all countries where subsidies are implemented. Thus in OECD countries 
agricultural subsidies (not specifically input subsidies) are widely recognised to be 
inefficient but have continued because they serve particular political interests. Input 
subsidies (fertiliser and electricity for example) persist for similar reasons in many Asian 
countries after they have served their role of kick starting rural growth, despite being 
extremely costly.   
 
Political economy difficulties can, however, be particularly problematic in poorer rural 
economies where (a) there are very substantial economic opportunity costs from the 
diversion of scarce fiscal resources to input subsidies and away from other productive 
investments (such as agricultural research or infrastructural development) and (b) 
potential personal and political gains from subsidy rents are very large relative to other 
income, patronage and rent seeking opportunities in the economy. A paradox arises in 
that while substantial political commitment is needed for large scale input subsidies to be 
implemented, the political objectives behind such commitment will often focus around or 
be shifted towards short term patronage opportunities. Unfortunately, however, pursuit of 
these opportunities tends to undermine the economic efficiency and wider pro-poor growth 
benefits of input subsidies -  by directing subsidies to less poor recipients with more 
political voice, directing subsidies towards cash crops,  undermining competition and 
efficiency in input delivery systems, and increasing leakages and non-transparent 
secondary markets. These difficulties are particularly prevalent in political systems with 
significant neo-patrimonial elements, as is common in many poorer rural economies, 
particularly   in Africa (van de Walle, 1999).  
 
A second paradox related to political economy also arises with regard to the importance of 
stable, continuing and longer term subsidies if they are to lead to supply system 
development and wider dynamic changes in rural economies (as discussed earlier in 
sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6). While this carries important benefits it also carries important 
risks, as if subsidies are not set up with clear time limits and if they continue for long 
periods then already substantial risks of their being politically entrenched and ‘hijacked’ 
are increased. Similarly the longer subsidies are in place and the more stable the subsidy 
systems,  the greater the opportunities for those wishing to perpetrate fraud and divert 
subsidies to find ways of doing so. There is therefore a substantial challenge in finding 
ways of promoting stability and trust for farmers and input suppliers while at the same time 
specifying clear exit mechanisms and rules (to reduce risks of political capture) and 
varying systems (to reduce fraud). 
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Understanding and addressing political economy issues in agricultural input subsidies is a 
difficult but very important issue. A key part of this is understanding the diverse legitimate 
and illegitimate interests and powers of different stakeholders (for example farmers with 
different livelihoods; produce buyers, sellers and consumers; tax payers; local and 
national politicians; technicians; donors; input supply businesses and employees;  civil 
society; government and private organisations and their managers, traditional leaders), as 
they relate to personal, local, organisational and wider political, financial, economic and 
symbolic24 constraints and objectives.  
3.4. Rethinking input subsidies: conclusions and conceptual frameworks 
 
The review in previous sections of new thinking and its implications allows us to identify 
new insights about the potential pitfalls and practice of smart subsidies and to draw out 
first the key elements of input subsidy programmes and second the major impacts that 
they may have. This then defines issues to be considered in evaluating them.  
 
3.4.1. Key elements of input subsidy programmes  
The ‘success’ of an input subsidy programme has to be judged against the objectives  of 
that programme. Input subsidy programmes can and do have a wide range of different 
possible objectives as set out in table 3.4.1.  
 
Table 3.4.1. Possible input subsidy programme objectives 
1 Wider (pro-poor) economic growth 
2 Consumer  benefits - lower output prices, access 
(emphasis on poorer consumers?) 
3 National / household food self sufficiency / security 
4 Input adoption  
5 Input use efficiency 
6 Addressing the price productivity tightrope 
7 Producer welfare (emphasis on poorer producers?) 
8 Input supply system development & efficiency 
9 Rents (supplier, producer, administrative, political) 
10 Soil fertility replenishment 
11 Political benefits (personal, party, etc) 
Note: these objectives are not arranged in any order of priority or importance 
 
Most of these objectives are mutually complementary. . However our analysis suggests 
that objective (1) in table 3.4.1 (a contribution to wider, pro-poor, economic growth) should 
normally be important and using the terminology of Dorward (2009) this will be supported 
by contributions to ‘hanging in’ from improved national and household food security 
(objective 3 in table 3.4.1); by contributions to ‘stepping up’ from  increased input 
adoption, efficiency in use, attention to the price productivity tightrope, improved producer 
welfare, and input supply system development (4 to 8); by contributions to ‘stepping out’ 
from attention to the price productivity tightrope, improved producer welfare, and input 
                                                      
24
  ‘Symbolic’ constraints and opportunities are those that while not apparently 
technocratically rational are pursued because they have significant symbolic 
importance. Examples include national food self-sufficiency – this may or may not be an 
economically efficient way of ensuring national food security, but in some countries it 
has significant symbolic political importance. Avoiding of weakness or devaluation of 
national currency is another example of a symbolic objective in some countries.  
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supply system development (6 to 8); and by contributions to all three of these 
transformations from soil fertility replenishment and from political benefits that support 
commitment of resources to effective and efficient subsidy implementation (10 and 11). 
However some objectives in table 3.4.1 may also be to a greater or lesser extent mutually 
incompatible (for example 2 and 7 may in some cases be incompatible, and pursuit of 9 is 
generally incompatible with many of the other objectives – although some rents may be 
necessary for political economy purposes to allow a subsidy to be implemented). It is also 
important to note that stated formal programme objectives may differ from the objectives 
of individual stakeholders.  
 
Given that the identification and prioritisation of objectives will be different in different 
situations, the balance of programme objectives should then determine the key design 
and implementation elements of input subsidy programmes. These are summarised in 
Table 3.4.2.  
 
Table 3.4.2. Key design and implementation elements of input subsidy programmes 
1 Basic subsidy system (focus on consumer or producer 
benefits, direct recipients) 
2 Product focus – staple foods, cash crops, etc 
3 Scale – beneficiary coverage 
4 Subsidy per beneficiary 
5 Total volumes subsidised 
6 Voucher or other entitlement systems, distribution and 
input access systems and timing 
7 Rationing – objectives, methods  
8 Targeting (if rationing) – objectives, criteria and methods 
9 Input supply systems (involvement of parastatal and /or 
private wholesale and retail suppliers) and timing 
10 Secondary market and leakage policies (and 
enforcement mechanisms) 
11 Complementary integration and investments and policies 
 
 
These elements have all been discussed explicitly or implicitly in earlier sections, which 
have suggested that input subsidies will generally (but not always) yield the greatest 
returns where they focus on consumer benefits and on indirect gains to pro-poor 
economic growth from increased food staple productivity, where they operate at a large 
enough scale (in terms of  the number of beneficiaries, the subsidy per beneficiary and the 
total subsidised volumes) to lower staple produce prices - but with rationing and targeting 
criteria and methods which direct subsidised inputs to producers whose productive input 
use is constrained by market failures which can be overcome or substantially reduced 
through the subsidy.  Such rationing and targeting will normally be best achieved by 
various forms of voucher systems which enable cost effective and timely input distribution, 
which support sustainable unsubsidised (commercial) input supply system development, 
and which limit secondary market development and leakages. Effective implementation of 
these various elements will normally require coordinated complementary investments and 
policies supporting infrastructural development, agricultural research and development, 
and efficient output markets offering lower and more stable staple prices to consumers.  
 
However as should also be clear from these sections, these elements are also highly 
inter-related, with many synergies and trade-offs.  These interactions are most easily 
identified around the themes of scale and scope: large scale subsidy programmes offer 
wider supply side benefits (in input supply system development, in consumer and dynamic 
31 
 
pro-poor growth impacts) but make effective, timely and efficient programme management 
more difficult and can crowd out complementary investments needed for higher 
productivity of input use. Different entitlement, targeting and rationing systems are 
effectively attempts to control the scale of subsidy programmes by directing limited 
resources to their most productive uses – but these are themselves often difficult and 
costly to implement. Indeed there is something of a paradox here, that it is in the 
application of targeted subsidies to input use on staple foods in poor rural areas that such 
subsidies both offer the greatest potential benefits and pose the greatest implementation, 
resourcing and coordination challenges (Dorward et al, 2009).  
 
The list of subsidy programme objectives and elements in tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 provide a 
useful set of criteria for characterising and evaluating different types of subsidy adopted 
by different countries at different times.  
3.4.2. Key input subsidy programme impacts 
Identification of critical issues to be considered when evaluating input subsidy 
programmes must be informed by an understanding of (a) programme objectives and (b) 
the processes by which programme investments, activities and objectives are related.  
Figure 3.4.1 provides a conceptual framework that draws on the analysis and issues 
addressed in sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.12 to identify key variables and relationships affecting 
input subsidy programme impacts.  
 
 
Figure 3.4.1 A conceptual framework for investigating agricultural input subsidies 
impacts 
1. Input subsidy 
implementation
Scale, cost, 
modalities, timing, 
targeting, rationing
3. Effects on Input Supply 
System
Private sector importers & 
large/ small distributors; 
Parastatals
Profits, cash flow, 
confidence, volumes, prices, 
investment, innovations, 
other services
4. Effects on Macro 
economy
Fiscal balance
Foreign exchange balance
Health, education, 
infrastructure, other 
agricultural spending
2. Effects on 
Rural Households
2a Effects on 
recipients
(different hholds & 
hhold members) 
Input access & use, 
farm & non-farm 
activities & productivity
Labour hire in/out
Crop purchases / sales, 
Income, Food security, 
Welfare, Vulnerability
2b Effects on non-
recipients
(different hholds & hhold
members)
Input access & use, farm & 
non-farm activities & 
productivity, Labour hire 
in/out, Crop purchases / 
sales, Income, Food security, 
Welfare , Vulnerability
Local & national, 
market & non-
market relations: 
(staple food, labour, 
cash, land, etc 
prices & flows)
Other macro-
economic 
management
Political 
economy & 
policy 
processes
Global & 
regional 
prices 
Staple  food 
market 
policies
Previous 
season(s)’ 
events & 
outcomes 
Weather 
Disease 
(HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, etc) 
Other rural 
economic 
activitiesOther social protection and agricutural / rural development Measures
 (adapted from SOAS et al, 2008) 
 
This framework in turn helps to identify critical outcomes that subsidy programmes may 
(or may not) deliver.  These are summarised in Table 3.4.3.  
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Table 3.4.3. Potential outcomes of input subsidy programmes 
1 Timing 
2 Performance monitoring and audit systems 
3 Input leakage, displacement 
4 Incremental input use 
5 Incremental production 
6 Increased productivity 
7 Output price changes (producer and consumer prices) 
8 Input price changes 
9 Labour market changes (hired labour demand, wages) 
10 Programme cost / benefit analysis (fiscal, economic) 
11 Welfare and growth impacts 
12 Macroeconomic effects 
13 Input supply system impacts  
14 Soil fertility replenishment 
  
 
Tales 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 then define key issues to be considered in evaluating input 
subsidy programmes as regards their objectives, their design and implementation and 
their impacts.  
 
4. Recent experience with input subsidies 
Having considered key features of input subsidy programmes (their potential impacts, 
objectives and features) we now turn to examine recent experience with their 
implementation. As noted earlier, there has been resurgent interest in input subsidies, in 
particular ‘smart subsidies’ for fertilisers in Africa. High food and fertiliser prices in the first 
part of 2008 added to this, with many reports of new or expanding subsidy programmes in 
different countries around the world. IFDC, towards the end of 2008, reported new, 
expanding or continuing subsidy programmes in China, India, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria and Malawi (http://www.ifdc.org/focusonfertlizer8.html). Other 
countries for which there are reports of new or expanded fertiliser subsidy programmes 
include Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Mali, Senegal, and Bangladesh. Unfortunately there 
are very few detailed and rigorous evaluations of most of these programmes – indeed it is 
often difficult to find even very basic information about them: ‘recent experience with input 
subsidies’ is difficult  to review. This lack of information is not surprising – given the 
ongoing emergence of many of these programmes and national rather than donor 
ownership.   
 
We therefore summarise observations from an examination of 10 fertiliser subsidy 
programmes in Africa, all except one of these implemented since the turn of the century. 
These have been selected on the basis of (a) availability of information and (b) 
representation of a range of different approaches to and types of subsidy programme25. 
                                                      
25
   A very large number of programmes and projects could be considered as providing 
some form of ‘input subsidy’ if this is interpreted in its widest sense as some form of 
public investment promoting input use, as, for example, agricultural research and 
extension, agrodealer development,  market development and rural road building are all 
forms of public investment that may be intended to directly or indirectly promote 
agricultural  input use. The programmes considered are restricted to those that provide 
some direct subsidy to input supply operations  (beyond input supply system 
development, although they may – and hopefully will - contribute to input supply system 
development as well) 
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Table 4.1 lists the 10 programmes and summarises the information available on each 
against key issues identified earlier in tables 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. Before considering the 
insights from this table and what it can teach us as regards general patterns of subsidy 
programme objectives, design, implementation and impacts we first briefly describe each 
of the programmes considered in table 4.1. 
4.1. Programme descriptions 
4.1.1. Ghana 
In early 2008 Ghana faced high food prices and rising fertiliser prices and the government 
and large fertiliser importers (who had significant but high priced fertiliser stocks) 
discussed the potential and possible modalities for a national fertiliser subsidy 
programme. Press reports (Ghana News Agency 9th June 2008, 3rd July 2008) indicate 
that the programme was formally announced in June 2008 and operated from July to 
December. A total of 30,000 tonnes of four types of fertiliser was made available by three 
major importers, with pan territorial farmer prices representing an approximate 50% 
subsidy, at a total cost of around US$15 million26.  Large numbers of vouchers (over 1 
million) were printed against planned subsidy sales of 600,000 bags. Deliveries were late 
for the cropping season in the south of the country (April to July), but were more timely for 
the north, and this may account for lower uptake and fertiliser sales in the south and use 
on a wider range of minor crops as compared with the north where there was more 
substantial uptake and use mainly on maize.  
 
Vouchers were distributed by Ministry of Agriculture staff, with wide variation in 
approaches, systems and numbers across different areas, and limited information to field 
level staff on the total number of vouchers that they would receive for distribution. 
Redemption prices varied geographically to provide pan-territorial farmer prices in district 
capitals, but this tended to discourage suppliers from supplying fertilisers outside district 
capitals as neither redemption nor farmer prices covered costs of transport outside district 
capitals. No subsidy sales were made by (smaller) distributors independent of the major 
fertiliser importers (indeed in the north unsubsidised sales were reported to be banned 
completely).   
 
Information on the Ghana 2008 fertiliser is obtained largely from Banful (2008).  
4.1.2. Zambia Fertilizer Support Programme (FSP) 
Zambia has been implementing fertiliser subsidies for a long period, but the current 
programme was initiated in 2002, and disburses an average of over 66,000mt of 
subsidised fertiliser per year. This is imported by private companies under government 
tender and then distributed to farmers through cooperative societies (Xu et al, 2008). 
There is anecdotal, press and survey evidence that substantial quantities of subsidised 
fertilisers are diverted from cooperatives and smallholder farmers to fertiliser traders, who 
then sell it at unsubsidised prices. The subsidised fertiliser that does reach smallholder 
farmers tends to go to less poor farmers (who, on efficiency grounds, are explicitly 
targeted by the programme) and may lead to substantial displacement (Minde et al, 2008). 
Nevertheless the programme is estimated to yield an economic cost benefit ratio that is 
greater than 1, though this is lower than might be achieved by alternative investments in 
longer term research or infrastructural programmes (Jayne et al, 2007). There has been 
substantial political controversy regarding the implementation of the 2008/9 programme. 
                                                      
26
 Total budgeted subsidy cost was $25 million but only about $15 million was directly for 
the subsidy inputs and voucher costs (pers. comm.., Afua Branoah Banful).  
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Table 4.1. Key features of reviewed input subsidy programmes 
 
 
 
  
Ghana Zambia FSP Kenya NAAIP Malawi AISP Malawi TIP Malawi 
Starter Pack 
Sasakawa 
Global 2000 
(Ethiopia) 
Millennium 
Villages 
(Malawi, Kenya) 
Malawi 
SPLIFA 
Nigeria: 
DAIMINA 
 Year Jul-Dec 2008 2002 onwards 2007 onwards 2005/6 
onwards 
2000/1-
2004/5 
1998/9-1999/2000 2006/7 onwards 2003/4 - 
2004/5 
2004 
 Source(s)  Minde et al 
(2009) 
Sikobe (2008) SOAS et al 
(2008) 
Levy (2002, 
2005) 
Levy (2002, 
2005) 
Crawford et al 
(2006) 
Buse et al 
(2008) 
Gregory 
(2009) 
Gregory 
(2009) 
            
Stated Objectives 
         
1 Wider (pro-poor) 
economic growth 
      long run 
aspiration 
long run 
aspiration 
  
2 Consumer  benefits 
(lower output 
prices, access)  
          
3 National / 
household food self 
sufficiency / 
security 
yes latterly - 
increased 
maize 
production 
hh food 
security/availa
bility  
yes targeted hh  long run hh /village food 
security 
hh food 
security  
 
4 Input adoption  yes initially remote 
smallholders 
yes remote capital 
constrained 
farmers 
 yes yes yes   
5 Input use efficiency   yes    yes    
6 Addressing the 
price productivity 
tightrope 
          
7 Producer welfare 
(emphasis on 
poorer producers?) 
yes (not 
apparent) 
yes (not 
apparent) 
yes stated in later 
years 
food 
insecure 
producers 
food 
insecure 
producers 
yes yes food insecure 
producers 
yes 
8 Input supply system development 
& efficiency 
yes yes  increasingly 
recognised 
   yes yes 
9 Soil fertility replenishment       ??   
10 Political benefits 
(not stated) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes     
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Table 4.1. Key features of reviewed input subsidy programmes (cont) 
  
Ghana Zambia FSP Kenya NAAIP Malawi AISP Malawi TIP Malawi 
Starter Pack 
Sasakawa Global 
2000 (Ethiopia) 
Millennium 
Villages (Malawi, 
Kenya) 
Malawi 
SPLIFA 
Nigeria: 
DAIMINA 
            
Design & implementation 
         
1 Basic subsidy 
system (focus & 
direct recipients) 
producers producers, but 
significant 
supplier capture 
producers, agro-
dealers 
producers subsistence 
producers 
subsistence 
producers 
producers subsistence 
producers 
subsistence 
producers & 
suppliers 
producer (25%) 
& supplier (50% 
60 day trade 
credit, training) 
2 Product focus – 
staple foods, cash 
crops, etc? 
staples intended 
but wide use 
staples staples mainly staples staples staples staples staples staples  
3 Scale? national scale national 36000 hh (2007) 
plan  2.5 million 
farmers 
national 
programme, >1.5 
million hh 
targeted 25%+ 
hh 
universal max  650,000 
farmers  
project villages 100,000 hh pilot 
4 Subsidy / 
beneficiary? 
50% costs 50% costs 100% on inputs for 
approx 0.4ha  
60 to 90% on 
inputs for approx 
0.4ha  
100% on 
inputs for 
approx 0.08ha  
100% on 
inputs for 
approx 0.1ha  
 100% on inputs for 
approx 0.4ha  
100% on 
inputs for 
approx 0.4ha  
25% subsidy on 
cash purchases 
5 Volume 
subsidised? 
30,000 tons of 
fertilizer, US$15 
million 
66,000mt 
average pa 
plan 250,000mt 
fertiliser 
130 to 220,000 
tonnes fertiliser, 
US$50-200 million, 
11,000 to 
50,000 tonnes 
fertiliser 
42,000 to 
44,000 tonnes 
fertiliser 
   385 mt fertiliser 
6 Voucher or other 
entitlement 
systems, 
distribution & input 
access systems  
vouchers subsidised sales 
by cooperatives  
vouchers vouchers physical 
distribution 
initially, moved 
to vouchers 
physical 
distribution 
initially, moved 
to vouchers 
physical 
distribution  
physical 
distribution?  
vouchers for 
work 
vouchers 
7 Targeting – 
objectives, criteria 
and methods 
None farmers with 1 to 
5 ha (less poor 
60%) 
resource poor with 
land; 
disadvantaged; 
potential group 
members 
poorer productive 
farmers (highly 
variable in 
practice) 
ineffective 
targeting of 
poor 
/vulnerable 
farmers 
universal more (potentially) 
productive farmers 
in more productive 
areas 
geographical (site 
selection) 
self / 
community 
targeting, food 
insecure  
 
8 Rationing intended fixed 
quantity / hhold, 
not consistently 
enforced  
 fixed quantity per 
farm hh 
fixed quantity per 
farm hh 
fixed quantity 
per farm hh 
fixed quantity 
per farm hh 
fixed quantity per 
farm hh 
fixed quantity per 
farm hh 
fixed quantity 
per farm hh 
 
9 Input supply 
systems  
Importer supply 
system 
cooperatives 
supplied by 
private imports 
private retailers/ 
agrodealers  
mixed, mainly 
parastatal & large 
private importers 
/retailers 
mixed, mainly 
private 
importers 
mixed, mainly 
private 
importers 
mixed  - including 
part government 
owned importers/ 
distributors 
 small 
agrodealers, 
supplies 
arranged by 
IFDC 
small 
agrodealers , 
50% trade credit 
10 Secondary market 
and leakage 
policies  
formally 
prohibited 
  prohibited prohibited prohibited     
11 Complementary 
integration & 
investments & 
policies 
no  extension, cereal 
banks,  group work 
(planned) 
some subsidised legume seed but  
supply shortages 
credit, extension, 
floor prices 
extension, health, 
education, 
community 
development 
agrodealer 
extension 
training, road 
construction 
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Table 4.1. Key features of reviewed input subsidy programmes (cont) 
  
Ghana Zambia FSP Kenya 
NAAIP 
Malawi AISP Malawi TIP Malawi Starter 
Pack 
Sasakawa Global 
2000 (Ethiopia) 
Millennium Villages 
(Malawi, Kenya) 
Malawi SPLIFA Nigeria: 
DAIMINA 
            
Outcomes 
          
1 Timing voucher issues 
July to Oct, 
late in south 
70% ok n/a last minute and later 
than optimum input 
delivery, has improved 
sometimes last 
minute/ late  
sometimes later 
than optimum 
input delivery 
generally good 
though lower costs 
if earlier   
good late input deliveries improved 
timeliness 
2 Internal monitoring & 
audit systems 
not reported not reported M&E 
planned 
internal M&E, limited 
audit systems 
independent & 
internal M&E 
independent & 
internal M&E 
some evaluation 
Howard et al 1999 
yes dealer  & farmer 
surveys 
dealer  & farmer 
surveys 
3 Input leakage, 
displacement 
some leakage 
to other crops 
substantial - ? 
70% leakage in 
2007/8, 40% 
displacement 
 limited leakage info, 
displacement with less 
poor beneficiaries & 
cash crop use: 20-40% 
low 
displacement 
estimates 
limited leakage 
info, low 
displacement 
estimates 
  limited; monitoring & 
transparency / 
accountability in 
community 
 
4 Incremental input use in regions with 
timely delivery 
variable - 60% if 
reaches 
smallholders? 
 60-80% for fertilisers, 
unknown for seeds 
no specific 
estimates 
no specific 
estimates 
Yes substantial 
incremental input 
use reported 
yes Yes 
5 Incremental production  Yes - but could be 
more 
 approx 30-40% maize 
production increase? 
40 - 350,000 
mt maize?  
350- 500,000mt 
maize? 
Yes substantial reported yes, but poor 
weather& late 
deliveries  
Yes 
6 Increased productivity  some  as above 40 to 125kg 
maize /hh 
170 kg maize /hh Yes substantial 
incremental land & 
hh productivity 
reported 
yes, see above  
7 Output price changes 
(producer & consumer 
prices) 
 modified by 
marketing policies 
 low prices only after 
2005/6, modified by 
marketing policies 
very limited - 
some high 
price years  
Yes, also with 
good rains 
large price fall led 
to credit defaults 
   
8 Unsubsidised input 
price changes 
 No  No reduction in import costs /margins 
during implementation 
    
9 Labour market 
changes (hired labour 
demand, wages) 
   following 2005/6 
subsidy 
    yes (limited scale)  
10 Programme cost / 
benefit analysis (fiscal, 
economic) 
 C:B ratio >=1.07   potential to be >1 
depending on yield 
gains & input & output 
prices. Fiscal 
efficiency depends on 
displacement rates 
 range of food security benefits 
and savings of emergency imports  
Economic CBA >1 
if extra production 
reduces imports, 
but not for export. 
Doubtful in less 
favourable areas 
   
11 Welfare and growth 
impacts 
   productivity gain 
benefits but  often 
consumer losses from 
higher maize prices  
limited social 
protection, 
divisive 
targeting 
lower maize prices  improved hh welfare 
reported 
improved beneficiary 
food security (less 
for female headed 
hh),improved roads  
 
12 Macro economic 
effects 
   significant budget 
impacts in 2008/9 
limited limited limited none none none 
13 Input supply system 
impacts  
negative 
except large 
importers 
negative  importers gain, 
agrodeales excluded 
from fertiliser supply, 
instability gives limited 
sustainable gains 
private input suppliers (fertiliser 
importers, seed companies, 
retailers and agro dealers) grew 
during starter pack & TIP 
implementation 
some crowding out 
of credit systems &  
independent 
distributors & 
retailers 
 increased trust from 
customers, dealer 
business benefits 
expanded farmer 
demand, dealer 
profits, turnover 
& system 
sustainability 
14 Soil fertility improved           
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4.1.3. Kenya National Accelerated Agricultural Input Programme (NAAIP) 
In 2007 the Kenya government decided to embark upon a National Accelerated 
Agricultural Input Programme to promote food security, agricultural input use, input market 
development, and agricultural productivity. Initially planned to subsidise fertilisers and 
maize seed for a limited number of districts, it has subsequently been expanded to 
national coverage with plans to provide 2.5 million farmers with maize seed and fertilisers 
for 0.4 ha each, with vouchers issued to targeted farmers (disadvantaged households with 
land) and subsequent redemption through private input sellers who would also be eligible 
for trade credit guarantees. Farmers will also benefit from linked extension, cereal banks, 
warehouse receipts, and participation in farmer groups (Sikobe, 2008). It has not been 
possible to access information on outcomes from the programme, but the programme is 
included in our review as an example of large scale programme design and 
implementation aspirations. 
4.1.4. Malawi Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP), Targeted Input 
Programme (TIP) and Starter Pack Programme (SP) 
Malawi has implemented a series of different national input subsidy programmes over the 
last 10 years, which have been supported by extensive monitoring and evaluation 
activities and have attracted considerable international interest.  
 
In the 1998/99 and 1999/2000 agricultural seasons the Malawi Government, with donor 
support, implemented a large scale programme under which all farm households in 
Malawi received an input ‘starter pack’ comprising 15 kg of fertiliser, 2 kg of maize seed 
and some legume  seed. With good rains, Malawi had large harvests these years. From 
2000/2001 the programme was scaled down to the ‘targeted input programme’ (TIP) with 
a smaller quantity of fertiliser (10kg) per beneficiary and targeted selection of 
beneficiaries. With poor rains and later delivery of inputs in some years, national 
production was very low with severe food shortages in 2001/2 and 2005/6 – and 
consequent large scale expansion of the number of TIP beneficiaries in these years. From 
2005/6, however, the government has taken a different approach with a very large scale 
programme (the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme or AISP) providing about 50% of 
farm households with vouchers for 100kg of fertiliser and small quantities of maize (and 
latterly legume) seed, with mainly privately imported fertilisers delivered principally, and in 
some years exclusively, by two parastatal input suppliers.  Levy and Barahona (2002) and 
Levy (2005) report extensively on the TIP and its predecessor the starter pack 
programme, while SOAS (2008) and Dorward and Chirwa (2009) review the (ongoing) 
AISP and have estimated positive returns to the 2006/7 programme depending upon 
prices, and implementation effectiveness and efficiency, with potential for very large 
returns or losses. Dorward et al (2008) provide historical and political context to these 
programmes.  
4.1.5. Sasakawa Global 2000 
During the 1990s the Sasakawa Global 2000 implemented a number of projects in 
different African countries under which farmers were given assistance in acquiring inputs 
on demonstration plots. We report here on experience in a major scaling up of this in 
Ethiopia as reported by Howard et al 1999.  
4.1.6. Millennium Villages 
The Millennium Villages Project has established integrated projects in selected villages to 
demonstrate the substantial changes that are possible with significant investments in 
health, agriculture and community development. A major part of this is the provision of 
subsidised agricultural inputs (seed and fertiliser). Although the projects have only been 
established relatively recently, monitoring and evaluation systems are in place and we 
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draw on reports from Kenya and Malawi (Buse et al, 2008; Denning et al, 2009). This 
approach has similarities with the Sasakawa Global 2000 approach in that it has invested 
in relatively small scale, localised input subsidy programmes with much wider objectives 
of national scaling up.   
4.1.7. Malawi Sustaining Productive Livelihoods through Inputs for Assets (SPLIFA) 
For two years when the Targeted Input Progamme was being implemented in Malawi, 
IFDC and partners also implemented an innovative project (Sustaining Productive 
Livelihoods through Inputs for Assets or SPLIFA) under which food insecure households 
in particular communities were provided with input vouchers as payment for public works. 
These vouchers could be redeemed at local agro-dealers, who were also supported with 
technical training, delivery of inputs, and a commission for voucher redemption (Gregory, 
2006). This project is of interest as an early use of vouchers with specific objectives to 
simultaneously support both agrodealer (input supply) development and food security 
among poor subsistence producers.   
4.1.8. Nigeria Developing Agricultural Inputs Markets in Nigeria (DAIMINA) 
The Developing Agricultural Inputs Markets in Nigeria (DAIMINA) project, also 
implemented by IFDC, also used vouchers to pursue twin objectives of agrodealer 
development and increased producer access to and use of  inputs (Gregory, 2006). Like 
the Malawi SPLIFA project, this was relatively small scale, but instead of providing free 
inputs to poor food insecure households it tested the use of vouchers within a much larger 
national fertiliser subsidy programme. The standard national programme purchased 
fertiliser from importers and then distributed to state level blenders and agricultural 
development programmes. This national progamme, however, undermined the 
development of private sector, commercial sales, and suffered from substantial leakages 
and non-payments from  states to the federal government. DAIMINA trialled the use of 
vouchers to allow small agrodealers to deliver subsidised fertiliser to farmers.   
 
4.2. Lessons from reviewed programmes  
Table 4.1 summarised information available for each of the 10 reviewed programmes 
against the major issues identified as important for subsidy programme evaluation. We 
consider these under the main headings of programme objectives, programme design and 
implementation, and programme outcomes.  
4.2.1. Programme objectives 
The first part of table 4.1 shows for each of the 10 reviewed programmes the stated 
objectives of the programme27. Here we consider how far the different possible 
programme objectives are found in the different programmes and types of programme.  
• food security (household or national), input adoption, and producer welfare are 
found as objectives of all or almost all programmes (with variation as regards 
particular emphasis on poorer or food insecure producers) 
• not one of the programmes explicitly recognises the potential for producer 
subsidies to benefit poor consumers28, except subsistence producers, and related 
to this there is no recognition of the potential role of subsidies in addressing the 
price-productivity tight rope and only in the Sasakawa 2000 and MVP is there a 
wider recognition of the potential role of subsidies in driving forward pro-poor 
                                                      
27
  Political objectives were not stated but are inferred from context, design and implementation. . 
28
  It may be that inclusion of recent programmes in Mali or Senegal (if information were available) 
would have provided examples of programmes with an explicit objective to reduce consumer 
prices. 
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growth: even here there is no explicit consideration of the mechanisms by which 
this may be achieved29 
• input use efficiency, input supply system development and soil fertility 
replenishment are only explicitly considered as programme objectives for particular 
programmes or types of programme 
• political considerations are important for all of the large scale programmes (Ghana, 
Zambia, Kenya and Malawi). 
4.2.2. Design and implementation 
Design and implementation features of the different programmes are shown in the second 
part of table 4.1.  
 
There is broad commonality across the different programmes as regards:  
• the basic focus of subsidy systems on producers as major (and generally sole) 
direct subsidy recipients;  
• a primary focus on subsidising inputs for staple food production (for subsistence 
production or for sale into domestic markets) ;  
• very substantial subsidised input price reductions (of 50% or more for all 
programmes except DAIMINA), consistent with measures to address both 
affordability and profitability constraints to input use;  
• all programmes rationing (or attempting to ration) the quantity of subsidised inputs 
to be received per household, with vouchers being a common (but not universal) 
means of achieving this; and 
• use of private sector importers to provide basic fertiliser supplies. 
 
There are differences across the programmes as regards:  
• scale, with some national programmes and others piloting potential national 
programmes;  
• targeting, with some programmes focussing on food insecure/ vulnerable 
households and others seeking to maximise production by focussing on less poor 
households (although this may be misguided  if (a) smaller, poorer farms are more 
efficient (Hazell et al, 2007) or (b) displacement is higher with less poor 
households);   
• use of vouchers for targeting, rationing, and/or supply system development; 
• private sector involvement (and nature of involvement) in distribution;  
• complementary policies, and their links to programme objectives.  
4.2.3. Programme outcomes 
Different programme outcomes – or information gaps about particular outcomes – are 
closely related to programme objectives. Thus limited examples of subsidies leading to 
output (food staple) price changes and the lack of information on labour demands and 
markets and longer term and wider welfare and growth impacts are not surprising. 
Similarly the lack of information on soil fertility replenishment is consistent with the lack of 
emphasis on this in programme objectives. There are, however, other similarities in 
outcomes that cut across differences in programme objectives, notably common (but not 
universal) problems with late input delivery in subsidy programmes (problems which are 
not confined to larger scale programmes) and common (and again not universal) lack of 
information on leakages (although such information is very difficult to collect and verify). 
Both of these are important for programme impacts, irrespective of programme objectives.  
Overall there appear to be large potential benefits from effective and efficient input 
                                                      
29
 Other programmes may also implicitly consider that increased productivity and producer welfare 
may drive forward growth, but consideration of the food price, non-staple and non-farm production 
and demand mechanisms is absent. 
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subsidy implementation – but also the potential for large economic losses. However it is 
very difficult to estimate indirect benefits from lower food prices, but there Is little 
information on output price impacts for most programmes, and lower prices have 
ambiguous effects: lower food prices lower returns as estimated from conventional 
cost:benefit analysis but should increase the wider economic benefits from the 
programme if these lead to indirect benefits from growth linkages or multipliers; in Ethiopia 
lower output prices as a result of increased production led to farmer losses and the 
collapse of the programme.  
 
There are also, of course, substantial differences across programmes, some of these 
related to differences in programme objectives, as noted above. Thus different welfare 
and growth impacts are related to differences in interest in these impacts, as are some 
differences in input supply system impacts. However programmes with the intention of 
developing supply systems may actually undermine them, if poorly designed and 
implemented: it appears that larger scales programme have tended to damage the 
commercial interests of local fertiliser distributors while offering benefits to fertiliser 
importers. Similarly differences in incremental input use, production, and productivity 
(fairly universal objectives) are determined more by differences in design and 
implementation effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
While all the programmes have some have external reporting (otherwise they could not be 
included in this review), there are marked differences in reported performance monitoring 
and audit systems. There are also very few programmes for which information on 
economic or fiscal returns are estimated (and where these are available they were 
provided by external reviews). This may be linked to the emphasis on production in 
programme objectives – though again information on production does not seem to be 
universally important.  
4.3. Conclusions from recent experience 
A number of observations from the limited programmes reviewed here warrant particular 
emphasis: 
 
First, it is notable how difficult it is to find comprehensive reviews of subsidy programmes, 
despite the substantial number of programmes that have been or are being implemented  
across Africa and the very substantial investments of public funds in these programmes. 
There is an important need for country studies to document country experiences, using 
the conceptual framework developed in this paper.  
 
Second, there is a strong tendency for programmes to focus on production objectives and 
producer welfare, and to ignore the interests of consumers and the processes (and 
necessary conditions) for subsidy programmes to contribute to wider pro-poor economic 
growth. This is a critical omission, and is linked to the limited extent that the design and 
implementation of many programmes are integrated with complementary investments. 
Such integration is needed first for subsidy programmes to effectively deliver their stated 
objectives of incremental production, and then for them to contribute to wider processes of 
pro-poor growth. Recognition of the importance of consumer price benefits and of the 
price productivity tightrope is particularly important here.  
 
Third, and related to the previous two points, there appears in some programmes to be an 
unfortunate lack of interest in improving effectiveness and efficiency. This is evident from 
the limited monitoring, evaluation and audit systems in some programmes, limited cost 
benefit and fiscal efficiency analysis, and limited attention to possible problems of 
displacement and leakage. This may be related to political economy issues (as discussed 
earlier in section 3.3.12). As will be discussed below (in section 5), growing challenges in 
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a changing world will make it even more important that governments improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of input subsidy programmes in both raising productivity and 
promoting wider pro-poor growth within and beyond agriculture.  
 
Two notable commonalities observed across programmes are (a) the lack or limited focus 
on replenishing soil fertility and (b) a strong (almost universal) prevalence of heavy 
subsidies (50% to 100% subsidy rates) on rationed inputs. This commonality occurs 
despite differences between programmes as regards first relative emphasis on improving 
national food security (and total input use and production) as against improving household 
food security (and helping food insecure households) and second relative emphasis on 
supply system development.  
 
5. Subsidy programmes in a changing world 
At the time when this review was conceived, global food and fertiliser prices were at 
almost unprecedented high levels, and a significant focus of the review was to be on the 
way that high food and fertiliser prices affected the benefits and costs of input subsidy 
programmes. Global food and fertiliser prices have, however, fallen right back since then, 
as shown in figure 5.1,  though domestic food and fertiliser prices remain high in many 
countries and international phosphate fertiliser prices have not fallen back as far as food 
and nitrogen fertiliser prices. The international credit crunch has also led to a global 
economic slow down. Looking back, the high food prices in mid 2008 are seen to result 
from the coincidence of a number of different processes and events: a steady decline in 
global agricultural investment,  in production growth and in food stocks; weather events in 
some grain producing areas; changing agricultural and environmental policies in many 
developed economies (including subsidies for biofuels); high oil prices; and complex 
international commodity market behavior, including financial speculation, physical 
hoarding, and national protectionism. Similar processes affected fertiliser prices. 
Paradoxically, interactions of these same processes together with the financial collapse 
then caused prices to fall again. The principal lesson that needs to be drawn from this is 
that we appear to live in a world with increasingly volatile and unpredictable markets and, 
with climate change, changing and more unpredictable weather. What are the implications 
of this for large scale input subsidy programmes?  
 
We address this question by first considering separately the effects of high food prices 
and of high fertiliser prices. We then examine the effects of interactions of price volatility 
between food and fertiliser prices, and conclude our discussion with consideration of the 
impacts of climate change.  
5.1. Impacts of high food prices 
Before we examine the impacts of high food prices for agricultural input subsidies, we 
must first briefly consider the effects of high food prices on poor rural economies and the 
people within them.  Impacts will vary for different people, and most obvious negative 
impacts will be on poor consumers who are connected to global markets – for example 
poor consumers whose staple food is imported grain of some sort. For consumers a rise 
in staple food prices leads to a fall in real income – the extent of the fall increasing with 
the importance of staple food expenditures in total expenditures, as illustrated in table 5.1.  
 
42 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Commodity price indices 2006 to February 2009 
 (2005 prices, 2005=1) 
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Table 5.1 Effects of 100% increase in staple food prices on total expenditures for 
high and low income households (illustrative figures) 
 Income Initial expenditures Expenditures after price rise 
  food expenditure balance 
non-food 
food expenditure balance non-
food 
  % initial hh 
expenditure 
$  $ % initial hh 
expenditure 
$ change 
High  7500 10 750 6750 1500 20% 6000 -11% 
Low  2500 30 750 1750 1500 60% 1000 -43% 
Very low  1500 50 750 750 1500 100% 0 -100% 
Extremely  low  1000 70 700 300 1400 140% -400 -233% 
 
Loss of real income has immediate effects on expenditures and consumption, welfare, 
and liquidity, and long term effects as a result of reduced expenditure on education, 
nutrition  and health. In addition the reduced real incomes and expenditures of large 
numbers of poor people will reduce aggregate demand and economic growth.  
 
It is often argued that opposite effects will be experience by food producers, but this is not 
the case as most poor producers, and indeed around 50% of all producers in much of 
Africa, are net buyers of food (in that they do not produce enough food for their annual 
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requirements, and hence rely on the market to purchase food, see for example Barrett 
2008). Such people are affected in a similar way as the consumers described above with 
the added problem that the consequent liquidity problems affect their seasonal 
investments in agriculture, in food production – poor households often have a backward 
sloping supply curve (see for example Dorward, 2006). Less poor farmers may also suffer 
(or at least not benefit) from higher food prices as much of their income may come from 
cash crops and non-staple animal and crop products ( rather than staple food crops) and 
demand and prices for these may be depressed.  
 
These considerations suggest that the poverty impacts of the 2008 food price hike may be 
considerably greater than the 100 million (around 10%) estimated increase reported by 
Ivanic and Martin (2008) as their estimate was based on 2007 price  increases and also 
ignored the liquidity effects discussed above, and balance of payment, inflation and other 
macro-economic effects. It also assumed that higher food prices lead to rural wage 
increases (whereas in the poorest economies with large numbers of food deficit producers 
high food prices can reduce rural wages – again see for example Dorward, 2006).  
 
This analysis, together with the analysis of potential subsidy impacts in earlier parts of this 
paper, suggests that high food prices substantially increase the potential benefits of well 
designed and implemented agricultural input subsidy programmes. Such programmes 
should address the affordability problems of input use which (for poorer, food insecure 
producers) are exacerbated  by high food prices (although profitability problems in input 
are of course diminished by high food prices), and increase the importance of input 
subsidies’ potential contributions to addressing the food price – productivity tightrope and 
to stimulating dynamic pro-poor growth and structural change.  Such situations may also 
improve the alignment between political economy and economic growth objectives of input  
subsidy programmes.  
 
5.2. Impacts of high fertiliser prices 
The impacts of high fertiliser prices on poor rural economies have been discussed by 
Dorward and Poulton (2008) and are summarised here.  Again we need to consider 
different impacts on different types of people within poor rural economies.  
 
Farmers are likely to be very exposed to high international fertiliser prices as most poor 
rural economies import fertilisers from the world market: they are then hurt by high 
fertiliser prices in terms both of the profitability of fertiliser use and the affordability of 
fertiliser purchases – the latter issue, as argued earlier in section 3.3.2, very important and 
easily overlooked. . Profitability problems may be offset by product price increases – but, 
for example, although food prices rose markedly in 2008 (though not as much as fertiliser 
prices), prices for cash crops (on which much fertiliser is used in Africa) were largely static 
- and average returns of fertiliser use on such crops were already not very high (Meertens, 
2005).  This may lead to political pressures for fertiliser subsidies for cash crops (from 
influential constituents) although the analysis earlier in this paper (in sections 2 and 3) 
suggested that input subsidies should yield higher returns when applied to staple crops as 
compared with cash crops. Here input subsidies may have a critical role to play as without 
them input use on food production may fall, increasing domestic prices, with all the 
attendant problems described above in section 5.1 – including further exacerbation of the 
affordability constraints to input use.  
 
However, while high input prices may increase the need for input subsidies, they also  
undermine their short term returns (as measured by cost benefit analysis)  and undermine 
a nation’s ability to afford them. The former issue arises because high input prices reduce 
the profitability of input use, the latter issue arises because national economies may be 
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undermined by reductions in growth as a result of reduced agricultural production while 
the foreign exchange balance may suffer from both more expensive inputs and reduced 
export volumes – these macro-economic problems will of course depend upon the 
importance in the economy of different forms of agriculture and of agriculture as a whole, 
and on the importance, performance and terms of trade of other sectors. However 
Ethiopia provides an example of a country where high fertiliser prices exacerbated foreign 
exchange difficulties which were then addressed by an IDA grant and credit totalling US$ 
250 million  to provide foreign exchange (but not domestic currency) for importation of 
fertilisers (World Bank 2008).  There are, therefore, close parallels between the threats 
and paradoxes posed to individual farmers by high fertiliser prices and those posed to 
national economies.  
 
Fertiliser suppliers may also be adversely affected by high fertiliser prices. While 
producers may enjoy large increases in profits if prices rise more than costs, the impacts 
on fertiliser traders and importers are more ambiguous and often negative. Traders with 
large stocks will gain if increasing fertiliser prices allow them to increase sales prices of 
existing stocks.  However they may suffer from reduced sales volumes if higher prices 
lead to reduced demand by farmers (as discussed above) and they may also find it 
difficult to raise the working capital to buy more expensive fertiliser stocks. Traders may 
also suffer from falls in fertiliser prices if they have bought when prices are high and hold 
high price stocks while competitors can bring in lower price stocks.  
 
Fertiliser prices have subsequently fallen back from the peak prices of mid 2008, but 
prospects for future prices are uncertain. Some observers predict increasing concentration 
among suppliers (Roy, 2009) and there are fears that carbon taxes and/or increasing oil 
prices may again push fertiliser prices up in the future.    
5.3. Interactions of price volatility between food and fertiliser prices 
What are the implications for input subsidy programmes of interactions of price volatility 
between food and fertiliser prices? 
 
Food and fertiliser prices may interact in a number of ways over different time periods. 
First, changes in the global economy and in global markets may impact them both in 
similar ways – for example high oil prices may simultaneously push up fertiliser prices (as 
energy costs are a major component of nitrogen fertiliser production costs) and, through 
increased biofuel demand, also push up grain (particularly maize or corn) prices. 
Commodity speculation may also push up food and fertiliser prices together.  Similarly, but 
over a different time span, credit difficulties may reduce both investment in fertiliser 
production plants and investment in fertiliser use for food production. High fertiliser prices 
may also lead to reduced food production in the subsequent season – and high food 
prices should push up fertiliser demand (if commercial farmers are not credit constrained) 
and hence fertiliser prices.  
 
These positive interactions between fertiliser and food prices may, however, also be offset 
by normal supply and demand responses to high prices. These are also, on the other 
hand, affected by seasonal time lags, which complicate the planning and management of 
input subsidy programmes. This may be illustrated by Malawi’s experience with input 
subsidies in 2007/8 and 2008/9. Rapid food and fertiliser price rises in international 
markets in late 2007 and early 2008 meant that relatively low priced fertiliser (bought in 
the middle of 2007) was used to produce maize harvested in mid 2008 when international 
prices were very high – yielding a very high estimate of economic returns from the input 
subsidy programme. For the 2008/9 programme, however, fertilisers were bought when 
prices were very high, but the maize produced by those fertilisers will be harvested  in 
March to May 2009, when, based on current prices, international maize prices are 
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expected to be very low – and as a result the 2008/9 programme may yield a very low 
estimated economic return (Dorward and Chirwa, 2009). Such temporal difficulties, 
together with the wider economic and balance of payments effects of fluctuating input and 
food prices, are likely to make management and control of input subsidy programme 
expenditures very difficult, and similar difficulties will be faced in attempts to stabilize food 
prices – while in section 3.3.6  it was argued that the complementary management of 
input programs and staple food price stabilization policies is critical for achievement of 
longer term economic growth benefits from input subsidy programmes.   
 
As another complication, general uncertainty in fertiliser and other commodity markets, 
and the potential for this to increase the likelihood of political interventions, also increases 
fertiliser traders’ and importers’ risks Dorward and Poulton (2008).  
5.4. Impacts of climate change 
Climate change will have varied and difficult to predict impacts on agriculture in Africa. 
Average annual rainfall may increase or decrease in different areas, but in almost all 
areas will become more variable, with increased incidence of both droughts and floods. 
This will increase market instability and both production and price risks in input use. At the 
same time there will be global mitigation policies that may discourage and/or raise the 
price of inorganic fertiliser use (as a result of high fossil fuel energy intensity and hence 
high carbon foot print of the manufacture of nitrogen fertilisers, and possible CO2 taxes or 
costs in reducing CO2 emissions). Increased resilience and reduced vulnerability in the 
face of the indirect and direct threats of climate change can be achieved by greater 
natural, social, physical, human  and financial capital and greater diversification of cops 
within farms and of farm and non-farm activities within local and national economies. 
Increased capital and diversification are intrinsic components of economic growth and 
development. The major implication of climate change for input subsidy programmes is 
therefore to increase the urgency and importance of such programmes’ contributions to 
rapid broad based pro-poor growth through more effective design and implementation and 
through more effective integration with complementary policies and programmes in food 
markets and prices, in natural resource conservation soil fertility, and in wider non-farm 
diversification and development.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Countries considering the introduction of agricultural input subsidies can learn a number 
of points from the theory and experience summarized in this paper, recognising the 
different major benefits they can potentially yield, the conditions required for those 
benefits to be realized, and the possible very significant pitfalls from ineffective or 
inappropriate implementation.  Key conclusions from theoretical and historical analysis are 
that:  
• input subsidies have played an important role in successful agricultural 
development in the past, offering major potential gain when effectively applied to 
overcome market failures constraining growth in poor rural areas, but also carrying 
substantial risks of costly, ineffective and inappropriate design and implementation 
using large amounts of scarce government and national resources for little gain; 
• they have greatest (but not exclusive) potential in contributing to wider growth 
when applied to the production of staple grains rather than to cash crops (as a 
result of both the greater contribution to overcoming producer constraints on input 
use in staple food production and the greater benefits to consumers from their 
stimulus to increased production of staples); 
• a key contribution of input subsidies will commonly be their contribution to 
consumers’ welfare and real incomes through lowering food prices, while also 
benefitting producers, but this requires very large scale implementation to bring 
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prices down (perhaps below import parity) with substantial costs and risks and a 
strong emphasis on wider pro-poor dynamic growth objectives and complementary  
investment and output market development policies; 
• the dynamic policy objectives of input subsidies are, like policy objectives in wider 
agricultural development, paradoxical – with investments in staple crop production 
and agriculture in order to stimulate diversification out of staple food and 
agricultural production; 
• rationing and targeting are important features of effective subsidies – to limit costs 
and ensure that subsidies are largely delivered to producers whose effective input 
use is constrained by market failures – and smart subsidies use for rationing and 
targeting can substantially address conventional criticisms of subsidies; 
• smart subsidies are nevertheless still subject to major political economy and 
implementation challenges and need further new thinking and theory, with ongoing 
action research seeking to constantly improve effectiveness and efficiency and to 
keep ahead of fraud and rent seeking. 
• agricultural input subsidies are not a short term ‘quick fix’ –medium to long term 
investments in input subsidies are needed if they are to build up farmer knowledge 
and capital, supply systems and wider economic growth. However the risks of their 
diversion, capture  and inefficiency also grow over time, and this poses major 
political and technical challenges.  
 
 
A review of a limited number of current and recent input subsidy programmes in Africa 
shows that there is limited implementation of important aspects of smart subsidies, and 
weaknesses in design and implementation. There is also a lack of emphasis on improving 
programme effectiveness and efficiency and inadequate attention is paid to integration 
with complementary policies and programmes for improving achievement of both direct 
and indirect benefits of input subsidy programmes. There is also a mixed record as 
regards use of input subsidies to develop input supply systems. Some of these aspects of 
input subsidy programmes are associated with divergence between political economy and 
more technocratic interests. Nevertheless these programmes have the potential to yield 
very substantial short term economic and longer term growth returns.  
 
Lack of information on subsidy programmes in Africa highlights a major need for country 
studies that report different countries’ recent experience with input subsidies, using the 
conceptual framework presented in this paper to allow a more comprehensive review and 
lesson learning than is currently possible. 
 
Consideration of the considerable challenges and threats posed by global market and 
climate change and volatility emphasises the importance and urgency of (a) improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of input subsidy programmes in contributing to increased 
agricultural productivity, food security, and wider non agricultural development and 
structural change, and (b) of looking for ways to reduce fertiliser use (through greater field 
efficiency in their application and through use of complementary soil fertility management 
practices) and to reduce supply costs.  
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Appendix 1: Effects of different output supply and demand elasticities on producer and 
consumer gains from input subsidies 
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